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Abstract. This paper investigates the market provision of firm-specific train-
ing, and identifies the inefficiencies associated with it. Within a general stochastic
learning-by-doing model, there is a potential inefficiency in the market provision
of firm-specific training. In order to determine whether this inefficiency is in fact
present, we analyze two special cases of the model: the accelerated productivity-
enhancement model and the accelerated learning model. In both models, the in-
efficiency is indeed present. However, the nature of the inefficiency depends on
the balance between the two key components of training, namely productivity en-
hancement and employee evaluation. In the accelerated productivity-enhancement
model, training results in an increase in productivity enhancement but no change in
employee evaluation, and training is overprovided by the market. In the accelerated
learning model, training results in a proportionate increase in both productivity en-
hancement and employee evaluation, and training is underprovided by the market.
In both cases, turnover is inefficiently low.
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1. Introduction
A widely documented feature of the US labour market is the high mobility of young
workers. A typical male worker will hold seven jobs during his first ten years in the
labour market. This number amounts to about two thirds of the total number of jobs he
holds during his entire career.1
There is a positive aspect to this mobility: job-shopping early in a worker’s career may
help him to settle into a good match relatively quickly. The worker does not therefore
spend too much time accumulating human capital specific to a bad match. There is also
a negative aspect: job-shopping early in a worker’s career may enable him to accumulate
a small amount of firm-specific human capital in each of a large number of firms, but
prevent him from accumulating a significant amount of firm-specific human capital in any
one firm.2
In a world in which the accumulation of firm-specific human capital is passive, it can
be argued that the market will achieve the optimal trade off between these two aspects
of mobility. Indeed, in such a world, the principal decision is made by the worker, who
must choose his employer. Moreover, firms can influence this choice via their wage offers.
The mobility decisions of the worker should therefore be socially efficient.3
In a world in which the accumulation of firm-specific human capital is active, the
situation is more complicated. There are now two decisions to be made: the worker must
choose his employer; and the employer must choose whether or not to train the worker
so as to enhance the accumulation of firm-specific human capital. Moreover, while firms
can still influence the worker’s choice of employer via their wage offers, a non-employer
cannot influence the training choices of an employer. Training choices cannot therefore
be expected to be socially efficient.4
1See Topel and Ward (1992).
2Cf. Section 4B of Heckman (1993).
3See Felli and Harris (1996). See also Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (1996) for a closely related model
that looks at a different application, namely sellers competing for a buyer through dynamic pricing. See
also Eeckhout and Weng (2015) for a model where human capital is “general” but learning and search
frictions generate workers’ mobility across jobs.
4Prendergast (1993) develops a model where an employer can create efficient incentives for a worker
(actively) to accumulate firm-specific human capital, by committing to a pay scale that associates dif-
ferent remunerations to different tasks associated, in turn, with different levels of firm-specific human
capital. The key difference between the analysis in Prendergast (1993) and our analysis is the ability of
the employer to commit to a pay scale. In our environment employers cannot commit to a long-term
contract. Therefore, the only mechanism through which different levels of firm-specific human capital
can be associated to different wage rates in equilibrium is the employers’ competition for the worker.
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The purpose of the present paper is to investigate the market provision of firm-specific
training, and to analyze the inefficiencies associated with it. To this end, we introduce a
stochastic learning-by-doing model.5
In the model, there are two firms and one worker. Within each firm the worker can be
allocated to one of two distinct activities that can be interpreted as a job (i.e. a productive
activity leading to market-valued output), or a training program (i.e. an activity not
necessarily associated with tangible output). In each period, the two firms compete for
the worker on the basis of her expected productivity in the two competing matches. Each
firm offers her a two-part contract, which specifies: (i) her wage; and (ii) whether she
will be assigned to the job or to a training program. The worker then chooses between
the two offers, and undertakes the assignment specified in her contract. This results in
a change in the expected productivity of the worker within the match. We think of the
mean and variance of this change in productivity as the productivity-enhancement and
employee-evaluation components of learning-by-doing, respectively.6
Both firms are free to adjust the wage element of their offers. The employer therefore
internalizes the preferences of the worker as to whether she should be assigned to the job
or to the training program. However, the other firm has no way to express its preference
as to whether the employer should assign the worker to the job or to the training program.
We should therefore expect that training will be inefficiently provided in equilibrium.
The natural question is then whether this inefficiency leads to underprovision or over-
5We follow Jovanovic (1979) in modelling the accumulation of firm-specific human capital in a
continuous-time setting. However, in our setting, firm-specific human capital is the current marginal
product of the worker.
6Case-study evidence seems to suggest that employee evaluation is a key component of the firm-specific
training programs offered by some European companies. For example, the Association of Retailers in
France provides a rather extended period of training for new employees. The training is formal, and
trainees who succeed in the final exam are awarded a professional diploma. Employees are initially selected
by individual retailers (normally supermarkets) and then enrolled in the training program. After the
training program, employees sometimes end up changing retailers. In other words, training does seem to
foster worker’s mobility. (Cf. The Retail Sector in France: Report for the Force Programme, CEDEFOP,
Berlin 1993.) Another example is the training provided by Mercedes Benz Car Dealers in Germany. The
employees are offered a whole range of training courses by the employers. New employees are offered
basic introductory training, and highly technical training programs are offered to the specialized work
force of the company through the Mercedez Benz training center. Training is clearly aimed at rendering
the participants fully familiar with new car models, and the human capital accumulated in these courses
is highly specific since it dies when the model is taken out of production. Evidence suggests that mobility
following the introductory course is particularly high: on average, only one in six trainees are retained
as employees. (Cf. Motor Vehicle Repair and Sales Sector: Germany Report for the Force Programme,
Berlin 1993.) This can be interpreted as evidence that employee evaluation is a relevant component of
the training program.
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provision of training. In order to answer this question, we need only determine whether
the other firm, the non-employer, assigns a positive or a negative value to training by
the employer. The assumption that, while on the job, a worker exclusively accumulates
firm-specific human capital implies that, from the point of view of the non-employer, what
matters is whether the worker will remain forever with the current employer or whether
she will eventually move. The critical step is therefore to identify how allocating the
worker to the training program affects the timing and probability that the worker will
eventually move. To this end, we analyze two distinct special cases of our model that differ
in the impact that training has on the productivity-enhancement and employee-evaluation
components of learning-by-doing.
The first special case that we consider is the Accelerated Learning Model (or ALM for
short). In this model, when the worker is assigned to the training program: productivity
enhancement and employee evaluation both increase by the same factor; but output is
foregone.7 For example, if the factor in question is 2 then, when the worker spends a
day training: the change in her productivity is the same as it would have been if she had
spent 2 days on the job; but she produces no output. Hence the entire future timepath
of the worker’s productivity with the current employer is traversed more quickly. In
particular: in those states of the world in which the worker originally remained with her
current employer forever, she will still remain with her current employer forever; and, in
those states of the world in which she eventually moved to the other firm, she will move
to the other firm sooner. In the first case, the other firm neither gains nor loses. In
the second case, the other firm gains. Indeed, it can put the worker to productive use
sooner. Training by the employer is therefore unambiguously good from the point of view
of the non-employer and, since the other firm’s preferences are not taken into account
in the training decision, training is underprovided in equilibrium. Moreover, given that
the benefit to the other firm of training is precisely that it causes the worker to change
employer sooner, turnover is inefficiently low.
The second special case that we consider is the Accelerated Productivity-Enhancement
Model (or APEM for short). In this model, when the worker is assigned to the train-
ing program: the productivity-enhancement component of the change in productivity
increases, but the employee-evaluation component remains unchanged; and output is, of
course, foregone. Hence the entire future timepath of the worker’s productivity with the
7There is also a direct cost of training.
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current employer is raised. This has two effects. First, in some states of the world in
which the worker eventually switched to the other firm, she will now remain forever with
the current employer. Secondly, even in states of the world in which she does eventually
switch to the other firm, the switch will occur later. In the first case, the other firm loses
an opportunity to put the worker to productive use altogether. In the second case, the
other firm has to wait longer before it has an opportunity to put her to productive use.
Training by the current employer is therefore unambiguously bad from the point of view
of the other firm and, since the other firm’s preferences are not taken into account in
the training decision, training is overprovided in equilibrium.8 Moreover, given that the
cost to the other firm of training is precisely that it delays the time at which the worker
changes employer, turnover is inefficiently low.9
The conclusions drawn from these two special cases of our learning-by-doing model
differ with regard to the nature of the inefficiency that arises in equilibrium: the ALM
predicts that training is underprovided; whereas the APEM predicts that training is
overprovided. The difference between these conclusions is attributable to the different
balance between the productivity-enhancement and employee-evaluation components of
training. However, both cases agree on the conclusion that turnover is inefficiently low.
In particular, the high mobility of young workers in the US labour market should not be
interpreted as an alarming indicator of the inefficiency of this labour market.
We would like to conclude this introduction by highlighting the methodological contri-
bution of our analysis. In the setting considered in the existing literature, equilibrium is
efficient. Building on this, it is possible to show that equilibrium is unique, and to find all
the elements of the unique equilibrium. For example, one can find the joint value function
of the three market participants, and the allocation of the worker between the two firms,
8The inefficiency in the second model of training is similar to that in Pissarides (1994). In that model,
workers underinvest in on-the-job search because they do not take into account the positive externality
that this search activity exerts on the other firm. As a result, turnover is inefficiently low and on-the-job
accumulation of firm-specific skills is inefficiently high.
9The argument that firm-specific training may inhibit turnover is already present in Becker (1993).
Becker suggests two reasons why this may be the case. First, the marginal product of a worker who
possesses firm-specific human capital may exceed her wage. This implies that such a worker is more
likely to be retained in the face of an exogenous downward shift in productivity (or an exogenous upward
shift in wages) than a worker who possesses only general human capital. Secondly, even if the marginal
product of such a worker falls below her wage, the firm may still choose to retain her. This is because, if
the firm lets her go during a downturn, it may be unable to rehire her during a subsequent upturn. In
other words, there is an option value associated with a worker who possesses firm-specific human capital
(Becker 1993, Chapter III.1). Becker’s is, however, a partial equilibrium model, and he does not therefore
comment on whether turnover is efficient.
Firm-Specific Training 5
by solving an optimization problem.10 In our setting, we do not have efficiency. However,
we are able to identify two partial efficiency properties. Building on these, we can for-
mulate a two-step procedure that allows us to characterize equilibrium in our model. In
particular, since the output of the procedure is unique, equilibrium is unique. Moreover
the procedure allows us to find all the elements of the unique equilibrium. For example:
one can find the joint value function of firm k and the worker, and the equilibrium training
allocation in firm k, by solving an optimization problem; and one can find the joint value
function of the three market participants, and the allocation of the worker between the
two firms, by solving a further optimization problem.11
Section 2 sets up the general stochastic learning-by-doing model. Section 3 defines
and characterizes equilibrium. Section 4 derives the equilibrium wage and the identity of
the employer, while Section 5 describes the worker’s mobility between the two employers
as well as the dynamics of wages. Section 6 discusses the efficiency properties of the equi-
librium allocation. In particular, the underprovision of training in the ALM is established
in Theorem 14 and the overprovision of training in the APEM is established in Theorem
16. Section 7 concludes.
2. The Model
There are three players: firm 1, firm 2 and the worker. At the outset of any given period
t ∈ [0,∞), all three of them observe the marginal products m1 ∈ [m1,m1 ] and m2 ∈
[m2,m2 ] of the worker in firms 1 and 2 respectively. The two firms then simultaneously
offer the worker contracts
(w1, a1), (w2, a2) ∈ R× [0, 1],
10Cf. Felli and Harris (1996) and Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (1996).
11Pastorino and Kehoe (2014) consider an experience-good model with a variety of goods. Their model
is analogous to our model, with their consumer corresponding to our worker and their variety of goods
offered by a firm corresponding to our variety of tasks offered by a given firm. From a game-theoretic
point of view, they allow for more than two tasks and more than two firms. They show that our two-step
characterization of equilibrium generalizes to this setting: the task chosen by each firm is that which
maximizes the joint payoff of the firm and the worker; and the firm chosen by the worker maximizes the
total payoff of all market participants conditional on the task choices of the individual firms. (They call
these properties match efficiency and conditional efficiency.) Like us, they also show (in two-firm, two-
task examples) that the market may both under- and over-provide information. However, their example
of overprovision complements our example in an interesting way. Finally, they show that efficiency may
fail even when there is no choice of task within a firm: if there are three or more firms, then the third
firm may have a preference as to whether the first or the second firm should be the employer. Since the
market does not provide any means for the third firm to express this preference, inefficiency may result.
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where wk is the wage that the worker will receive, and ak is the fraction of her time that
she will devote to training, if she accepts the contract proposed by firm k. The worker
then chooses an employer i ∈ {1, 2}, and works/trains for that employer for the duration
dt of the current period. As a result:
1. The employer i receives a payoff of (pii,ai(mi)− wi) dt, where:
(a) pii,ai(mi) = γi(1− ai) pii,W(mi) + ai pii,T(mi);
(b) pii,W(mi) = mi;
(c) pii,T(mi) = −κi;
(d) γi is a twice continuously differentiable function such that γi(0) = 0, γi(1) = 1,
γ′i > 0 on [0, 1] and γ
′′
i < 0 on [0, 1];
(e) κi is the cost per unit time to firm i of training the worker.
2. The worker receives a payoff of wi dt.
3. The non-employer j = 3− i receives a payoff of 0 dt.
In other words, if the worker spends all of her time at firm i working – i.e. ai = 0 – then
she generates output mi, and the revenue of the firm is pii,ai(mi) = pii,W(mi) = mi; if she
spends all of her time at firm i training – i.e. ai = 1 – then she imposes a cost κi, and the
revenue of the firm is pii,ai(mi) = pii,T(mi) = −κi; and if she spends a fraction of time at
firm i training then the revenue of the firm is a combination of the revenue from working
and the revenue from training that is concave in the time spent working and linear in the
time spent training.
Next, the change dmi in the marginal product of the worker in firm i is distributed
normally with mean µi,ai(mi) dt and variance Σi,ai(mi) dt, where
µi,ai(mi) = (1− ai)µi,W(mi) + ai µi,T(mi),
Σi,ai(mi) = (1− ai) Σi,W(mi) + ai Σi,T(mi);
and the change dmj in the marginal product of the worker in firm j is distributed normally
with mean 0 dt and variance 0 dt. In other words, if the worker spends all her time at
firm i working, then the change dmi in her marginal product is distributed normally
with mean µi,W(mi) dt and variance Σi,W(mi) dt; if she spends all her time at firm i
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training, then the change dmi in her marginal product is distributed normally with mean
µi,T(mi) dt and variance Σi,T(mi) dt; and therefore, if she spends a fraction 1 − ai of
her time working and a fraction ai of her time training, then the change dmi in her
marginal product is distributed normally with a mean that is the corresponding convex
combination of µi,W(mi) dt and µi,T(mi) dt and with a variance that is the corresponding
convex combination of Σi,W(mi) dt and Σi,T(mi) dt.
We make the following assumptions about µi,W, µi,T, Σi,W and Σi,T. For A ∈ {W,T}:
(µ1) µi,A(mi) > 0;
(µ2) µi,A(mi) = 0;
(µ3) µ′i,A ≤ 0 for all mi ∈ [mi,mi ];
(µ4) µ′′i,A ≥ 0 for all mi ∈ [mi,mi ];
(Σ1) Σi,A(mi) > 0 for all mi ∈ (mi,mi );
(Σ2) Σi,A(mi) = Σi,A(mi) = 0.
The idea behind our stochastic learning-by-doing model can now be explained as
follows. At the most basic level, working for firm i results in learning by doing. This can
be captured by temporarily dropping Assumption Σ1 (which requires that Σi,W > 0 on
(mi,mi )) and requiring instead that Σi,W = 0 on (mi,mi ), so that
dmi = µi,W(mi) dt.
In other words, the simple fact of working for firm i results in a change in the marginal
product of the worker in that firm. Assumptions µ2 and µ3 ensure that this change
is positive (i.e. µi,W ≥ 0); but, in view of Assumption µ3, increases in productivity are
harder to achieve for a more productive worker (i.e. µ′i,W ≤ 0); and, in view of Assumption
µ4, this latter effect becomes weaker as productivity increases (i.e. µ′′i,W ≥ 0). Finally,
in order to ensure that mi does not drift out of the interval [mi,mi ], we need to assume
that µi,W(mi) ≥ 0 and µi,W(mi) ≤ 0. These conditions are implied by Assumptions µ1
and µ2.
At the next level up, working for firm i still results in learning by doing, but now
that learning is stochastic instead of deterministic. This can be captured by reinstating
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Assumption Σ1 (i.e. by requiring once again that Σi,W > 0 on (mi,mi )), so that
dmi = µi,W(mi) dt+
√
Σi,W(mi) dZi,
where Zi is a standard Wiener process.
12 In other words, the change in the marginal
product of the worker that results from working for firm i is now stochastic. Of course,
we need to ensure that mi does not diffuse out of the interval [mi,mi ]. This follows
immediately from Assumption Σ2.
At the third and final level, the worker can engage in one of two activities when
employed by firm i: she can work or she can train. If she works, then
dmi = µi,W(mi) dt+
√
Σi,W(mi) dZi
as before; and, if she trains, then
dmi = µi,T(mi) dt+
√
Σi,T(mi) dZi.
Furthermore she can, if she wishes, divide her time between the two activities, spending
a fraction 1− ai of her time working and a fraction ai training. In that case
dmi = ((1− ai)µi,W(mi) + ai µi,T(mi)) dt+
√
(1− ai) Σi,W(mi) + ai Σi,T(mi) dZi.
In other words, the means and the variances combine in the natural way.13
3. Equilibrium
Suppose that the current state is
m = (m1,m2) ∈ [m1,m1]× [m2,m2],
12This formulation of the stochastic differential equation for mi ensures that the mean and variance of
dmi are µi,W(mi) dt and (dmi − µi,W(mi) dt)2 =
(√
Σi,W(mi) dZi
)2
= Σi,W(mi) dt respectively.
13The case is analogous to that of taking the sum of nW i.i.d. random variables with mean µW and
variance ΣW and nT i.i.d. random variables with mean µT and variance ΣT. In that case the sum has
mean nW µW + nT µT, variance nW ΣW + nT ΣT and standard deviation
√
nWΣW + nT ΣT.
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that the continuation payoffs of firm 1, firm 2 and the worker are given by the functions
U1, U2, V : [m1,m1]× [m2,m2]→ R
and that the actions chosen by the three players are (w1, a1), (w2, a2) and i. Then, if the
employer, namely firm i, applies the discount factor r exp(−r (s− t)) to payoffs received
at time s ∈ [t, t+ dt], its expected payoff is
(1− exp(−r dt)) (pii,ai(mi)− wi) + E [exp(−r dt)Ui(m+ dm)] .
In other words, it receives a flow payoff of pii,ai(mi)−wi over the interval [t, t+ dt), followed
by the continuation payoff Ui(m + dm) at time t + dt.
14 Using Itoˆ’s Lemma, this payoff
can be written in the form
(r dt) (pii,ai(mi)− wi) + (1− r dt) (Ui(m) + (Li,aiUi)(m) dt)
= (1− r dt)Ui(m) + r dt
(
pii,ai(mi)− wi + 1r (Li,aiUi)(m)
)
,
where the operator Li,ai : H 7→ Li,aiH is defined by the formula
(Li,aiH)(m) = µi,ai(mi)
∂H
∂mi
(m) + 1
2
Σi,ai(mi)
∂2H
∂m2i
(m).
In particular, it is a positive affine transformation of the payoff
pii,ai(mi)− wi + 1r (Li,aiUi)(m). (1)
Similarly, assuming that the non-employer, namely firm j = 3− i, uses the same discount
factor as the employer, its expected payoff is
(1− r dt)Uj(m) + r dt
(
1
r
(Li,aiUj)(m)
)
.
14The expected payoff of the employer can be understood in more detail as follows. If her flow payoff
pii,ai(mi)−wi is constant over the interval [t, t+ dt), then the present discounted value of her flow payoff
over this interval is∫ t+dt
t
r exp(−r (s− t)) (pii,ai(mi)− wi) ds = (1− exp(−r dt)) (pii,ai(mi)− wi).
If, furthermore, the change in m over this interval is dm, then the present discounted value of her
continuation payoff at time t+dt is exp(−r dt)Ui(m+dm). Adding these two terms together and taking
expectations leads to the formula given.
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This is a positive affine transformation of the payoff
1
r
(Li,aiUj)(m). (2)
Finally, the expected payoff of the worker is
(1− r dt)V (m) + r dt (wi + 1r (Li,aiV )(m)) .
This is a positive affine transformation of the payoff
wi +
1
r
(Li,aiV )(m). (3)
Now, the set of subgame-perfect equilibria of a game is unaffected by positive affine trans-
formations of the payoffs of the players. We are therefore led to the following definition.
Definition 1 [The Constituent Game]. Suppose that the state is m and that the contin-
uation payoffs of firm 1, firm 2 and the worker are given by the functions U1, U2 and V .
Then the constituent game is the two-stage game in which:
1. In the first stage, firms 1 and 2 simultaneously propose contracts (w1, a1) and
(w2, a2).
2. In the second stage, the worker observes (w1, a1) and (w2, a2) and chooses an em-
ployer i ∈ {1, 2}.
3. The payoffs of the employer, the non-employer j = 3 − i and the worker are given
by (1), (2) and (3).
Notice that the payoff of the employer in the constituent game has three components,
namely: (i) the output pii,ai(mi) produced by the worker; less (ii) the wage wi paid to the
worker; plus (iii) the discounted shadow value 1
r
(Li,aiUi)(m) to the employer of the change
in the worker’s productivity that occurs as a result of the worker working/training for the
employer. Similarly, the payoff of the non-employer has only one component, namely the
discounted shadow value 1
r
(Li,aiUj)(m) to the non-employer of the change in the worker’s
productivity that occurs as a result of working for the employer. Finally, the payoff of the
worker has two components, namely: (i) the wage wi received from the employer; plus
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(ii) the discounted shadow value 1
r
(Li,aiV )(m) to the worker of the change in the worker’s
productivity that occurs as a result of working for the employer.
Next, let SPEP(m,U1, U2, V ) denote the set of subgame-perfect equilibrium payoff
vectors of the constituent game. Then we have the following definition:
Definition 2 [Markov-Perfect Equilibrium Value Functions]. The continuation-payoff func-
tions U1, U2 and V are the value functions of a Markov-perfect equilibrium of the dynamic
game iff, for all states m, we have
(U1(m), U2(m), V (m)) ∈ SPEP(m,U1, U2, V ).
This definition departs from the usual approach to defining equilibrium in dynamic
games in two ways. First, instead of defining equilibrium in terms of the strategies of
the players and then characterizing it using dynamic programming, it defines equilibrium
directly using dynamic programming. This approach allows us to move more quickly to
the economics of the problem. Second, instead of including both strategies and value
functions in the dynamic program, it includes only value functions. It can certainly be
expanded to include strategies as well. However, the focus on value functions is better
suited to the refinement of Markov-perfect equilibrium that we introduce below.
Unfortunately, there is a large multiplicity of Markov-perfect equilibria in the dynamic
game. This corresponds to the large multiplicity of subgame-perfect equilibria in the
constituent game. To understand how this latter multiplicity arises, it will be helpful to
consider a simple two-stage game. In this game, there are two firms and a worker. In the
first stage of the game, the firms simultaneously and independently offer wages w1 and
w2. In the second stage, the worker chooses an employer i. The payoff of the employer i
is then mi−wi; the payoff of the non-employer j = 3− i is 0; and the payoff of the worker
is wi.
Even this simple game typically has a continuum of subgame-perfect equilibria. If
m1 < m2, then an action profile (w1, w2, i) is the outcome of a subgame-perfect equilibrium
iff m1 ≤ w1 = w2 ≤ m2 and i = 2. Similarly, if m1 > m2, then an action profile (w1, w2, i)
is the outcome of a subgame-perfect equilibrium iff m2 ≤ w1 = w2 ≤ m1 and i = 1.
However, in the former case, any outcome in which w1 = w2 > m1 seems implausible:
firm 1 is bidding more than the worker is worth to it, and it is unclear what could possibly
motivate such a bid. Similarly, in the latter case, any outcome in which w1 = w2 > m2
seems implausible.
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Now, the constituent game is more complicated than this example in two respects.
First, firms offer contracts (w1, a1) and (w2, a2) rather than simply wages w1 and w2. As
a result, there is a second dimension to the continuum of equilibrium: the training alloca-
tions ak can vary as well as the wages wk. Second, there are non-pecuniary externalities:
if the worker works/trains for firm 1, then firm 2 still receives the payoff 1
r
(L1,a1U2)(m),
which depends directly on the action chosen by firm 1. We think of this as the outside
option of firm 2. Similarly, if the worker works/trains for firm 2, then firm 1 still receives
its outside option 1
r
(L2,a2U1)(m).
Nonetheless, the multiplicity of subgame-perfect equilibria in the constituent game can
be eliminated using a simple economic argument. For example, in any subgame-perfect
equilibrium in which firm 2 is the employer, firm 2 matches the offer of firm 1. The
worker is therefore indifferent between working for firm 1 and working for firm 2. Hence,
while the equilibrium prescribes that the worker should choose firm 2, she does not have
any particular reason to do so. Hence firm 1 should bear in mind the possibility that
the worker will depart from the equilibrium prescription, i.e. that she will choose firm
1 instead. In particular, firm 1 should not make any offer that makes sense only on the
assumption that it will be rejected.
Now, firm 1 can always ensure that its offer (w1, a1) is rejected by making w1 low
enough. In this way, it ensures that it receives its outside option
1
r
(L2,a2U1)(m).
On the other hand, if – for any reason – its offer is accepted, then it receives
pi1,a1(m1)− w1 + 1r (L1,a1U1)(m).
Hence it should confine itself to offers for which the latter quantity is at least as big as
the former. The same logic applies to firm 2. This motivates the following refinement of
subgame-perfect equilibrium in the constituent game.
Definition 3 [Cautious Equilibrium in the Constituent Game]. A cautious equilibrium
of the constituent game is a subgame-perfect equilibrium ((w1, a1), (w2, a2), ι) of that
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game15 such that
pi1,a1(m1)− w1 + 1r (L1,a1U1)(m) ≥ 1r (L2,a2U1)(m) (4)
and
pi2,a2(m2)− w2 + 1r (L2,a2U2)(m) ≥ 1r (L1,a1U2)(m). (5)
We shall refer to (4) and (5) as the cautious-equilibrium constraints of firm 1 and firm
2 respectively.
Remark. Cautious equilibrium as we have defined it here is a refinement of subgame-
perfect equilibrium in the sense that it selects a subset of the set of all subgame-perfect
equilibria. We have motivated this selection using a simple economic argument. However,
there are at least two ways of providing a more formal justification for the selection: one
can build a game-theoretic foundation in the spirit of trembling-hand perfection;16 and
one can build a behavioral foundation based on probabilistic choice.17
Remark. The cautious-equilibrium constraint of the employer is always satisfied in a
subgame-perfect equilibrium. This is because the employer’s offer is accepted, and the
employer therefore gives explicit consideration to the alternative of making a lower offer
and receiving its outside option instead. It is the cautious-equilibrium constraint of the
non-employer that bites.
Our next theorem gives explicit formulae for the cautious-equilibrium payoffs of the
three players in the constituent game. In order to state this theorem, it will be helpful to
have some notation. For all states m and all continuation-payoff functions U1, U2 and V ,
put
a∗1(m,U1, U2, V ) = argmax
a˜1
{
pi1,a˜1(m1) +
1
r
(L1,a˜1(U1 + V ))(m)
}
,
a∗2(m,U1, U2, V ) = argmax
a˜2
{
pi2,a˜2(m2) +
1
r
(L2,a˜2(U2 + V ))(m)
}
15Here (w1, a1), (w2, a2) ∈ R× [0, 1] are the strategies of the two firms, and ι : (R× [0, 1])2 → {1, 2} is
the strategy of the worker.
16See Appendix A.1.
17See Appendix A.2.
Firm-Specific Training 14
and
S = U1 + U2 + V.
In other words: let a∗1 be the training allocation that maximizes the joint payoff of firm 1
and the worker; let a∗2 be the training allocation that maximizes the joint payoff of firm 2
and the worker; and let S be the joint continuation-payoff function of the three players.
Then:
Theorem 4.
1. The constituent game has a cautious equilibrium in which firm 1 is the employer iff
pi1,a∗1 +
1
r
L1,a∗1S ≥ pi2,a∗2 + 1r L2,a∗2S
and, in this case, there is precisely one such equilibrium. Similarly, the constituent
game has a cautious equilibrium in which firm 2 is the employer iff
pi1,a∗1 +
1
r
L1,a∗1S ≤ pi2,a∗2 + 1r L2,a∗2S
and, in this case, there is precisely one such equilibrium. In particular, cautious
equilibrium always exists, and it is unique iff pi1,a∗1 +
1
r
L1,a∗1S 6= pi2,a∗2 + 1r L2,a∗2S.
2. The cautious-equilibrium training allocations offered by firm 1 and firm 2 are a∗1
and a∗2; and the cautious-equilibrium payoffs of firm 1, firm 2 and the worker are
1
r
L2,a∗2U1 + max
{(
pi1,a∗1 +
1
r
L1,a∗1S
)− (pi2,a∗2 + 1r L2,a∗2S) , 0} ,
1
r
L1,a∗1U2 + max
{(
pi2,a∗2 +
1
r
L2,a∗2S
)− (pi1,a∗1 + 1r L1,a∗1S) , 0} ,
min
{
pi1,a∗1 +
1
r
L1,a∗1S, pi2,a∗2 +
1
r
L2,a∗2S
}− 1
r
L2,a∗2U1 − 1r L1,a∗1U2.
In particular, the cautious-equilibrium training allocations offered by firm 1 and
firm 2, and the cautious-equilibrium payoffs of firm 1, firm 2 and the worker, are all
unique (irrespective of whether cautious equilibrium itself is unique).18
In other words, there is a cautious equilibrium in which firm 1 is the employer iff the
joint payoff of all three players when firm 1 is the employer (and the training allocation is
18We shall see below that the cautious-equilibrium wages offered by firm 1 and firm 2 are also unique.
However, we do not need this result in the present section.
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a∗1) is at least as high as the joint payoff of all three players when firm 2 is the employer
(and the training allocation is a∗2). Similarly, there is a cautious equilibrium in which
firm 2 is the employer iff the joint payoff of all three players when firm 2 is the employer
(and the training allocation is a∗2) is at least as high as the joint payoff of all three players
when firm 1 is the employer (and the training allocation is a∗1). In particular, while
the cautious-equilibrium choice of employer by the worker is not necessarily unique, it is
always constrained efficient (in the sense that it maximizes the joint payoff of the three
players taking the training allocations offered by the two firms as given). Furthermore
the training allocations offered by the two firms are themselves pairwise efficient, in the
sense that a∗k maximizes the joint payoff of firm k and the worker.
Remark. This pairwise efficiency makes economic sense: given that the wage component
of the contract offered to the worker by firm k effectively allows side payments to be made,
one would expect that Coasian bargaining between firm k and the worker would lead to
a pairwise efficient training allocation.
Turning to the formulae for the cautious-equilibrium payoffs of the three players,
note first that the cautious-equilibrium payoff of firm 1 has two components. The first
component, namely
1
r
L2,a∗2U1,
is the outside option of firm 1. It is the discounted shadow value to firm 1 of the learning
that takes place about the worker’s productivity in firm 2 if the worker works/trains for
firm 2 and training is given by a∗2. It can be thought of as the outside option of firm 1.
The second component is
max
{(
pi1,a∗1 +
1
r
L1,a∗1S
)− (pi2,a∗2 + 1r L2,a∗2S) , 0} .
This is, roughly speaking, the marginal contribution of firm 1 to the joint payoff of the
three players. The cautious-equilibrium payoff of firm 2 is completely analogous.
As for the equilibrium payoff of the worker, this has three components. The first
component is
min
{
pi1,a∗1 +
1
r
L1,a∗1S, pi2,a∗2 +
1
r
L2,a∗2S
}
.
This is, roughly speaking, the part of the joint payoff of the three players that the worker
can capture thanks to the competition between the two firms for her services. The second
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and third components are
−1
r
L2,a∗2U1 and − 1r L1,a∗1U2.
These are (minus) the cost to the worker of compensating firm 1 for the loss of its outside
option and (minus) the cost to the worker of compensating firm 2 for the loss of its outside
option.
Overall, then, the employer gets its outside option plus its marginal contribution to
the joint payoff of the three players; the non-employer gets only its outside option; and
the worker gets the non-employer’s contribution to the joint payoff of the three players
less the outside options of the two firms.
Proof of Theorem 4. See Appendix A.3. 
Next, let us denote the unique cautious-equilibrium payoff vector of the constituent
game by CEP(m,U1, U2, V ). Then we can refine our preliminary definition of equilibrium
in the dynamic game, namely Definition 2 above, to obtain:
Definition 5 [Markov-Cautious Equilibrium Value Functions]. The continuation-payoff
functions U1, U2 and V are the value functions of a Markov-cautious equilibrium of the
dynamic game iff, for all states m, we have
(U1(m), U2(m), V (m)) = CEP(m,U1, U2, V ).
Taken in conjunction with the explicit formulae for the cautious-equilibrium payoffs
of the three players given in Theorem 4, this definition yields a system of three partial
differential equations for the value functions of the three players. We refer to this system
as the Bellman system of the dynamic game.19
The single most important step in our analysis is our characterization of Markov-
cautious equilibrium value functions. This is the content of the next theorem.
Theorem 6. Suppose that we construct functions
F1, F2, G : [m1,m1 ]× [m2,m2 ]→ R
and
A1, A2 : [m1,m1 ]× [m2,m2 ]→ [0, 1]
19This system is set out explicitly in equations (22-24) of Appendix A.4.
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using the following procedure:
Step 1 For k ∈ {1, 2}, let Fk be the unique solution of the Bellman equation
Fk = max
a˜k
{
pik,a˜k +
1
r
Lk,a˜kFk
}
. (6)
Step 2 For k ∈ {1, 2}, put
Ak = argmax
a˜k
{
pik,a˜k +
1
r
Lk,a˜kFk
}
. (7)
Step 3 Let G be the unique solution of the Bellman equation
G = max
k
{
pik,Ak +
1
r
Lk,AkG
}
. (8)
Suppose furthermore that we put U1 = G−F2, U2 = G−F1 and V = F1 +F2−G. Then
U1, U2 and V solve the Bellman system of the dynamic game. Conversely, if U1, U2 and V
solve the Bellman system of the dynamic game, and if we put F1 = U1 +V , F2 = U2 +V ,
G = U1 + U2 + V ,
A1 = argmax
a˜1
{
pi1,a˜1 +
1
r
L1,a˜1(U1 + V )
}
and
A2 = argmax
a˜2
{
pi2,a˜2 +
1
r
L2,a˜2(U2 + V )
}
,
then F1, F2, G, A1 and A2 are the functions generated by the procedure above.
In the procedure described in the statement of the theorem, the pairwise value function
Fk is the value function obtained when firm k and the worker operate as a team under
autarky. It is necessarily unique, because it is the value function of an optimization
problem. The training function Ak is the optimal policy associated with Fk. It is unique
because the maximand pik,a˜k +
1
r
Lk,a˜kFk is strictly concave in a˜k. The grand value function
G is the value function obtained when all three players operate as a team, with the crucial
proviso that they take the Ak as exogenous when they do so. Like Fk, G is necessarily
unique: it is the value function of a two-armed bandit problem.
Proof of Theorem 6. See Appendix A.4. 
Firm-Specific Training 18
The final step in our analysis is to establish the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium
in the dynamic game. This follows easily by combining the characterization of equilibrium
provided by Theorem 6 with the fact that the functions Fk, Ak and G are all unique.
Corollary 7. The Bellman system of the dynamic game has a unique solution.
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
Remark. In the models of Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (1996) and Felli and Harris (1996),
it was shown that Markov-cautious equilibrium was efficient. Furthermore, this efficiency
allowed them to solve for equilibrium by solving a three-player-team optimization problem
which took the form of a bandit problem. In the current paper, Markov-cautious equi-
librium is no longer efficient. However, Theorem 6 and Corollary 7 show that it is still
possible to solve for equilibrium. This is achieved by replacing efficiency with constrained
efficiency, and by replacing the team optimization problem with a two-step procedure. The
first step of this procedure involves solving two two-player-team optimization problems to
find the training allocations. The second step involves solving a further three-player-team
optimization problem which again takes the form of a bandit problem.20
4. Wage Offers and the Choice of Employer
Our analysis of Markov-cautious equilibrium so far can be summarized as follows. If the
functions F1, F2, G, A1 and A2 are constructed as in Theorem 6, then the equilibrium
value functions of firm 1, firm 2 and the worker are given by the formulae U1 = G − F2,
U2 = G−F1 and V = F1+F2−G. Furthermore, the training component of the equilibrium
strategies of firm 1 and firm 2 are given directly by A1 and A2. In this section, we fill out
this picture of equilibrium in two ways. First, we give expressions for the wage components
W1 and W2 of the equilibrium strategies of firm 1 and firm 2. Second, we will give a partial
characterization of the worker’s equilibrium choice of employer.21
Theorem 8. We have
W1 = F2 −max
{(
pi2,A2 +
1
r
L2,A2G
)− (pi1,A1 + 1r L1,A1G) , 0}
20One can think of the model of Felli and Harris (1996) as the special case of the current model in
which training is constrained to be 0: A1 = A2 = 0. (I.e. the worker must always work.)
21We already have one partial characterization of the worker’s equilibrium choice of employer: if pi1,A1 +
1
r L1,A1G > pi2,A2 +
1
r L2,A2G, then firm 1 is the employer; and if pi1,A1 +
1
r L1,A1G < pi2,A2 +
1
r L2,A2G,
then firm 2 is the employer. This characterization is certainly of conceptual interest. But it does not give
much insight into concrete questions such as: in which states is firm k the employer?
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and
W2 = F1 −max
{(
pi1,A1 +
1
r
L1,A1G
)− (pi2,A2 + 1r L2,A2G) , 0} .
In other words W1 has two components, namely: (i) the pairwise value F2 of firm 2
and the worker; less (ii) the marginal contribution of firm 2 to the joint payoff of the three
players. The components of W2 are analogous.
More explicitly, if pi1,A1 +
1
r
L1,A1G > pi2,A2 +
1
r
L2,A2G, then: (i) firm 1 is the employer;
(ii) the marginal contribution of firm 2 to the joint payoff of the three players is zero, and
therefore W1 = F2; and (iii) the marginal contribution of firm 1 to the joint payoff the
three players is strictly positive, and therefore W2 < F1. In other words: the employer
pays the worker the flow equivalent of the autarky value of the match between the worker
and the non-employer; but the non-employer offers a wage that is less than the flow
equivalent of the autarky value of the match between the worker and the employer. If
pi1,A1 +
1
r
L1,A1G < pi2,A2 +
1
r
L2,A2G then analogous remarks apply. In particular, firm
2 is the employer. If pi1,A1 +
1
r
L1,A1G = pi2,A2 +
1
r
L2,A2G, then nothing in our analysis
so far tells us which firm will be the employer. However, we do know that the marginal
contribution of both firms to the joint payoff the three players is zero, and therefore that
W1 = F2 and W2 = F1. Hence, unless F1 = F2 (and we shall see below that this is hardly
ever the case), the wage will change discontinuously when the worker switches employer.
Moreover, the jump in her wage could be either positive or negative, depending on the
direction of the switch.
Proof. See Appendix A.6.
At one level, Theorem 8 tells us what the equilibrium wage will be: it will be F2 when
firm 1 is the employer and F1 when firm 2 is the employer. However, we do not yet have a
concrete answer to the question as to which firm will be the employer. In order to obtain
one, we begin by introducing what we shall call the retirement problem of team k. In
this problem, the team consisting of firm k and the worker takes the training function
Ak under autarky as exogenous. However, it has the option of ceasing production at any
time, and taking the lump sum b ∈ R instead. We denote the value function for the
retirement problem of team k by Rk = Rk(mk, b). We then have:
Definition 9. The Gittins index of firm k is the function Γk : [mk,mk ] → R given by
the formula
Γk(mk) = min{b | b ∈ R, Rk(mk, b) = b}.
Firm-Specific Training 20
In other words, Γk(mk) is the smallest lump sum b that ensures that team k is willing to
retire when its productivity is mk.
The Gittins index will allow us to make precise the idea that the employer will be the
firm in which the worker’s productivity is higher.22 The first step towards this goal is to
establish some important properties of the Gittins index in our model.
Lemma 10. Put F k = Fk(mk ) and F k = Fk(mk ). Then Γk is strictly increasing and
continuous, with Γk(mk ) = F k and Γk(mk ) = F k.
Proof. See Appendix A.7.
The second step is to note that the Gittins index does indeed allow us to identify the
equilibrium employer.
Theorem 11. If Γ1(m1) > Γ2(m2) then firm 1 is the employer, and if Γ2(m2) > Γ1(m1)
then firm 2 is the employer.
Proof. The proof follows standard lines. Cf. Karatzas (1984).
Putting Lemma 10 and Theorem 11 together, we see that the employer will be the firm
in which the worker’s productivity is higher, in the sense that the Gittins index of that
firm is higher. Furthermore, because the Γk are strictly increasing and continuous, there
must be a strictly increasing and continuous switching curve in the productivity rectangle
[m1,m1 ] × [m2,m2 ] such that firm 2 is the employer above the switching curve and
firm 1 is the employer below the switching curve. However, neither our earlier criterion
in terms of the joint payoffs pik,Ak +
1
r
Lk,AkG, nor the Gittins indices Γk(mk), give a
complete answer to the question as to which firm is the employer at any given point on
the switching curve.23
5. Equilibrium Dynamics
Armed with the formulae for the equilibrium wage offers which were given in Theorem 8
and the Gittins index, the properties of which were set out in Theorems 10 and 11, we
22For a model where the Gittins index representation does not hold, see Ke and Villas-Boas (2014).
23In practice, the points of the switching curve fall into one of two sets. The time spent in the first
set by any solution to the dynamics is always 0, so that the choice of employer there is irrelevant. As for
the second set, the choice of employer at points in that set is uniquely determined by the requirement
that the dynamics be soluble. Either way, the equilibrium dynamics are unique, even though the choice
of employer is not always so.
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can now provide a detailed description of the mobility of the worker and the dynamics of
wages.
It follows from Theorems 10 and 11 that firm 1 will always be the employer if F 1 > F 2
and firm 2 will always be the employer if F 2 > F 1. For in those cases one firm is uniformly
more productive than the other. Leaving knife-edge cases aside, this leaves us with four
main scenarios:
Scenario 1 F 2 < F 1 < F 1 < F 2.
Scenario 2 F 2 < F 1 < F 2 < F 1.
Scenario 3 F 1 < F 2 < F 2 < F 1.
Scenario 4 F 1 < F 2 < F 1 < F 2.
In Scenario 1, the Gittins interval
[
F 1, F 1
]
of firm 1 is nested within the Gittins interval[
F 2, F 2
]
of firm 2. Firm 2 therefore has greater upside and greater downside than firm
1. In Scenario 2, the two Gittins intervals overlap: firm 1 has greater upside than firm 2,
and firm 2 has greater downside than firm 1. Scenarios 3 and 4 are just Scenarios 1 and
2 with the roles of the two firms reversed. We shall therefore focus on Scenarios 1 and 2.
Figure 1 shows the worker’s choice of employer (which is denoted I) in Scenario 1.
In this figure, the Gittins rectangle
[
F 1, F 1
] × [F 2, F 2] is divided into 6 regions. In
the first region (light green trapezoid), the Gittins index Γ2 of firm 2 is higher than the
Gittins index Γ1 of firm 1 but lower than its maximum possible value F 2. Hence firm
2 is the employer and the state m = (m1,m2) moves vertically and stochastically until
Γ2 either converges to its upper bound F 2 or hits its lower bound Γ1. (The state moves
vertically because m1 only changes when the worker is employed by firm 1, and it moves
stochastically because Σ2,A2 > 0 throughout the trapezoid.) If Γ2 hits Γ1, then the worker
will switch from firm 2.24 Finally, since there is a strictly positive probability that the
worker will switch from firm 2, we have G > F2 (i.e. the grand value of all three players
is greater than the pairwise value of firm 2 and the worker).25
24Notice that, while it is accurate to say that “the worker will switch from firm 2”, it would not be
accurate to say that “the worker will switch from firm 2 to firm 1”. Indeed, if τ is the first time at which
Γ2 = Γ1, then – for all ε > 0 – the interval (τ, τ + ε) contains an employment spell with firm 1 and an
employment spell with firm 2.
25It can be shown that G > F2 in the first region. Cf. Lemma 13 below.
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In the second region (dark green horizontal line at the top of the figure), Γ2 has reached
its maximum possible value F 2. Hence firm 2 is the employer and m does not change.
(Here m1 does not change because the worker is not employed by firm 1, and m2 does not
change because µ2,A2 = Σ2,A2 = 0.) Finally, since the worker remains with firm 2 forever,
we have G = F2.
The third region (light blue triangle) is similar to the first. In this region, the Gittins
index Γ1 of firm 1 is higher than the Gittins index Γ2 of firm 2 but lower than its maximum
possible value F 1. Furthermore Γ2 > F 1. Firm 1 is the employer, and the state moves
horizontally and stochastically until Γ1 either converges to its upper bound F 1 or hits its
lower bound Γ2. If Γ1 hits Γ2, then the worker will switch from firm 1. Finally, since
there is a strictly positive probability that the worker will switch from firm 1, we have
G > F1.
26
The fourth region (dark blue vertical line on the right-hand side of the figure) is similar
to the second. In this region, Γ1 has reached its maximum possible value F 1. Furthermore
F 1 < Γ2 ≤ F 1. Firm 1 is the employer and the state does not change. Finally, since the
worker remains with firm 1 forever, we have G = F1.
In the fifth region (dark blue rectangle at the bottom of the figure), the Gittins index
Γ2 of firm 2 is less than or equal to the minimum possible value F 1 of the Gittins index
of firm 1. Firm 1 is therefore uniformly more productive than firm 2. Hence firm 1 is the
employer and the state moves horizontally. Indeed, the dynamics of m1 are exactly what
they would be in the team problem for firm 1 and the worker. Finally, since the worker
remains with firm 1 forever, we have G = F1.
In the sixth and final region (red diagonal), F 1 < Γ1 = Γ2 < F 1. I.e. the Gittins
indices of the two firms are equal, and lie strictly in between the minimum and maximum
possible values of the Gittins index of firm 1. This is the interior of the switching line.27
The first thing to note about this line is that the time spent on it does not contribute
directly to the dynamics (not even in the sense of local time): the dynamics simply cross it.
Indeed, in a typical realization of the dynamics, the worker will have spells of employment
with both of the two firms. Each of these spells will consist of a (relatively) open subset
of the timeline [0,∞). The union of these spells will also be open, and its complement –
26Lemma 13 below shows that G > F1 in the third region.
27The switching line is the locus of points such that F 1 ≤ Γ1 = Γ2 ≤ F 1. The interior of the switching
line is the locus of points such that F 1 < Γ1 = Γ2 < F 1. In what follows, it should be clear from the
context whether we have in mind the switching line or its interior.
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which is the time spent on the switching line – will be closed. The union will have full
measure, and its complement will have measure 0.
The second thing to note about the switching line is that it provides a convenient
benchmark for the progress of the dynamics. Specifically, if the worker is currently em-
ployed by firm 1, then Γ1(m1) > Γ2(m2) and the next point to be visited on the switching
line (if any) will be (Γ2(m2),Γ2(m2)). Similarly, if the worker is currently employed by
firm 2, then Γ2(m2) > Γ1(m1) and the next point to be visited on the switching line
(if any) will be (Γ1(m1),Γ1(m1)). Hence B(m) = min {Γ1(m1),Γ2(m2)} provides the re-
quired benchmark. (Notice that B is non-increasing, and that it decreases only when the
dynamics are on the switching line. It can be thought of as a measure of the worker’s
current standing in the market.) More explicitly, we can conceptualize the dynamics
as consisting of progress down the switching line interspersed with excursions into the
employment regions of the two firms.
Building on the information contained in Figure 1, we can also describe the dynamics
of the equilibrium wage W . In the employment region of firm 1 (i.e. where Γ1 > Γ2), we
have W = W1 = F2. So W will remain constant until the dynamics – which are horizontal
– reach the switching line.28 Similarly, in the employment region of firm 2 (i.e. where
Γ2 > Γ1), we have W = W2 = F1. So W will remain constant until the dynamics – which
are vertical – reach the switching line. It can also be shown that, on the switching line,
we have F1 > F2.
29 Hypothetically speaking, then: if the worker switches from firm 1 to
firm 2, then her wage jumps up; and if she switches from firm 2 to firm 1, then her wage
jumps down.30
Figure 2 shows the worker’s choice of employer in Scenario 2. In this figure, the Gittins
rectangle is again divided into 6 regions, with only minor differences in the details of each
region. There is, however, one important change: on the switching line we have F1 > F2
for low values of the Gittins index and F2 > F1 for high values of the Gittins index.
31 In
28By contrast, the wage W2 offered by firm 2 will not remain constant. This is because the second
component of W2, namely the marginal contribution of firm 1 to the joint payoff of the three players,
does not remain constant.
29This is particularly apparent at the endpoints of the line (i.e. the points Γ1 = Γ2 = F 1 and
Γ1 = Γ2 = F 1). At these points, we have: (i) G > F2 (because the worker switches from firm 2 at these
points); and (ii) G = F1 (because the worker remains at firm 1 forever once these points are reached).
30These statements are hypothetical because direct switches from firm 1 to firm 2, and from firm 2 to
firm 1, do not in fact occur on the equilibrium path. Cf. footnote 24.
31This is easy to verify at the endpoints of the line. At the point Γ1 = Γ2 = F 1, we have: (i) G > F2
(because the worker switches from firm 2 at this point); and (ii) G = F1 (because the worker remains at
firm 1 forever once this point is reached). By the same token, at the point Γ1 = Γ2 = F 1, we have: (i)
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particular, there is a single point on the switching line at which F1 = F2.
A clear lesson about wages on the switching line therefore emerges: at any point on
the line, one firm has a higher upside and the other is safer. The safer firm is worth more
(in the sense that the pairwise value of that firm and the worker is greater), but it makes
sense for the firm with the higher upside to bid the worker away from the safer firm. To
do so it has to pay a higher wage.
6. Inefficiency
Theorem 6 shows that Markov-cautious equilibrium has two precise, but limited, efficiency
properties:
Property 1 For k ∈ {1, 2}, the equilibrium training function Ak is pairwise efficient.
That is, it would be the optimal training function if firm k and the worker operated
as a team under autarky.
Property 2 The equilibrium choice of employer is constrained efficient. That is, it would
be optimal if the three players operated as a team, provided that they took the Ak
as exogenous when they did so.
The very precision of these properties makes it easy to identify their limits. Property 1
tells us that the level of training offered by a firm takes the interests of that firm and
the worker, and only those interests, fully into account. In particular, the interests of the
other firm are completely excluded from the decision. Property 2 tells us that, while the
choice of employer takes the interests of all three players fully into account, it takes the
training levels within the firm as given. Overall, Property 1 tells us that the provision of
training may be inefficient, but Property 2 tells us that – if so – then this will be the only
inefficiency.
In this section, we introduce two special cases of our stochastic learning-by-doing
model. We show that, in both of these cases, the potential inefficiency identified in the
previous paragraph is present. Furthermore, in one case training is underprovided, and
in the other case it is overprovided.
The first special case is the ALM (Accelerated Learning Model). In this model, the
benefit of training is quantitative: the marginal product of the worker evolves faster, but
G > F1 (because the worker switches from firm 1 at this point); and (ii) G = F2 (because the worker
remains at firm 2 forever once this point is reached).
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the pattern of evolution is unchanged. In effect, when the worker works, 1 hour’s worth of
evolution takes place in 1 hour; whereas, when she trains, λ > 1 hours’ worth of evolution
take place in 1 hour. More explicitly,
(µk,T,Σk,T) = (λµk,W, λΣk,W) .
The cost of training is twofold: there is the direct cost of training, captured by κk, and
there is an opportunity cost, in that the output associated with working is lost.
The second special case is the APEM (Accelerated Productivity Enhancement Model).
In this model, the benefit of training is that the expected increase in the worker’s pro-
ductivity when she trains is λ > 1 times what it would have been if she had worked. The
variance of the increase is unchanged. More explicitly,
(µk,T,Σk,T) = (λµk,W,Σk,W) .
The cost of training is the same as in the ALM.
We will show that, in the ALM, training is underprovided (in the sense that the shadow
value of training to the non-employer is positive). By contrast, in the APEM, training
is overprovided (in the sense that the shadow value of training to the non-employer is
negative). In this way we establish two things. First, there really is an inefficiency in the
provision of training. Second, the sign of this inefficiency could go either way, depending
on how training affects the evolution of productivity.
6.1. The Accelerated Learning Model (ALM). The equilibrium training alloca-
tion within firm 1 is based on the marginal joint payoff to firm 1 and the worker of having
the worker work a little less and train a little more in firm 1. In the ALM, this marginal
payoff is
− (γ′1(1− a1)m1 + 1r L1,WF1)+ (−κ1 + 1r L1,TF1) .
In other words, a small increase in the training allocation: (i) reduces output by γ′1(1 −
a1)m1; (ii) increases training costs by κ1; (iii) generates an increase in the learning from
training with discounted shadow value 1
r
L1,TF1; and (iv) generates a reduction in the
learning from working with discounted shadow value 1
r
L1,WF1. On the other hand, the
social value of training within firm 1 is measured by the marginal joint payoff to all three
players of having the worker work a little less and train a little more in firm 1. In the
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ALM, this is
− (γ′1(1− a1)m1 + 1r L1,WG)+ (−κ1 + 1r L1,TG) .
Hence, corner solutions aside, training is underprovided in equilibrium iff the latter exceeds
the former, i.e. iff
−1
r
L1,WG+
1
r
L1,TG ≥ −1r L1,WF1 + 1r L1,TF1
or
(λ− 1) 1
r
L1,WG ≥ (λ− 1) 1r L1,WF1.
This in turn is equivalent to
1
r
L1,WU2 ≥ 0. (9)
That is, corner solutions aside, training is underprovided iff the shadow value to firm 2 of
learning in firm 1 is positive. This makes intuitive sense: the payoff of firm 2 is not taken
into account when the training allocation in firm 1 is chosen, and hence there will be too
little training by firm 1 if firm 2 places a positive value on training by firm 1.
In what follows we shall show that inequality (9) does indeed hold in the ALM. Fur-
thermore we shall show that it holds as a strict inequality whenever firm 2 is still in
contention, in the sense that: either (i) firm 2 is currently the employer (so firm 2 will
employ the worker for a non-trivial length of time starting immediately); or (ii) there is
a positive probability that the Gittins index of firm 1 will fall below that of firm 2 (so
there is a positive probability that firm 2 will employ the worker for a non-trivial length
of time in the future). More precisely, we have the following definition.
Definition 12. Firm 2 is still in contention iff: either (i) Γ2 ∈
(
F 1, F 1
]
and Γ1 < F 1;
or (ii) Γ2 ∈
(
F 1, F 2
]
.
Lemma 13. U2 ≥ 0, with strict inequality iff firm 2 is still in contention.
It is easy to see why the weak inequality holds. When the grand team consisting of
all three players solves for its value function G (taking A1 and A2 as given), one of the
strategies available to it is to have the worker work in firm 1 at all times. In this way it
will obtain the value F1. Hence G ≥ F1 and U2 = G−F1 ≥ 0. As for the strict inequality,
firm 2 always earns its marginal contribution to the joint payoff of the three players, and
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this marginal contribution is strictly positive iff Γ2 > Γ1. So we certainly expect a strict
inequality whenever firm 2 is in contention.
Proof. See Appendix A.8.
Theorem 14. Suppose that Γ1 ≥ Γ2. Then L1,WU2 ≥ 0, with strictly inequality iff firm
2 is still in contention.
The intuition behind this result is as follows. Suppose that the worker is currently
employed by firm 1. Then there are two possible outcomes. First, the worker may change
employers in due course. Second, the worker may remain with firm 1 forever. Increasing
the amount of time that the worker spends training does not change the probabilities of
these two outcomes, but it does bring forward the time at which the first outcome occurs.
Doing so is therefore good for firm 2, which receives its continuation payoff – which is
strictly positive by Lemma 13 – sooner.
As for the implications of the theorem for training as such, there are three possibilities.
At one extreme, we could have
1
r
(λ− 1)L1,WG ≤ γ′1(1)m1 + κ1.
In other words, the grand shadow value of training is less than or equal to the marginal
cost of training, even if the worker works full time. In this case, there will be no training
whether or not we take firm 2’s preferences into account. At the other extreme, we could
have
1
r
(λ− 1)L1,WF1 ≥ γ′1(0)m1 + κ1.
In other words, the pairwise shadow value of training is greater than or equal to the
marginal cost of training, even if the worker does no work. In this case there will be
full-time training whether or not we take firm 2’s preferences into account. Finally, we
could have
1
r
(λ− 1)L1,WF1 < γ′1(0)m1 + κ1
and
1
r
(λ− 1)L1,WG > γ′1(1)m1 + κ1.
In other words, we might not be in either of the two extreme cases. Taking account of
firm 2’s preferences would then result in a strict increase in training (since γ1 is strictly
concave).
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Proof. By construction of F1 and A1, we have
F1 = max
a˜1
{
pi1,a˜1 +
1
r
L1,a˜1F1
}
= pi1,A1 +
1
r
L1,A1F1.
Also, since Γ1 ≥ Γ2, we have
pi1,A1 +
1
r
L1,A1G ≥ pi2,A2 + 1r L2,A2G
and therefore
G = max
k
{
pik,Ak +
1
r
Lk,AkG
}
= pi1,A1 +
1
r
L1,A1G.
Hence
U2 = G− F1 =
(
pi1,A1 +
1
r
L1,A1G
)− (pi1,A1 + 1r L1,A1F1)
= 1
r
L1,A1G− 1r L1,A1F1 = 1r L1,A1U2 = 1r ((1− A1) + A1 λ)L1,WU2.
Hence
L1,WU2 =
U2
1
r
((1− A1) + A1 λ) .
Hence the sign of L1,WU2 is the same as that of U2. The result therefore follows from
Lemma 13.
Notice that the reason why firm 2 likes training is that it shortens the time that the
worker spends with firm 1. In other words, firm 2 would like to increase turnover. But
this means that turnover is inefficiently low.
Corollary 15. Suppose that Γ1 ≥ Γ2. Then L1,WV ≤ 0, with strictly inequality iff firm
2 is still in contention.
In other words, the shadow value to the worker of training in firm 1 is non-positive,
and it is strictly negative iff firm 2 is still in contention.
The intuition behind this result parallels the intuition behind Theorem 14. Suppose
that the worker is currently employed by firm 1, that her productivity in firm 2 is m2
and that m1 is the point to which her productivity in firm 1 would have to fall to induce
her to switch from firm 1. (I.e. m1 solves the equation Γ1(m1) = Γ2(m2).) As long
as she remains with firm 1, her wage remains unchanged at F2(m2). Furthermore, at
the time at which she switches from firm 1, her continuation payoff will be V (m1,m2).
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Now, V (m1,m2) = F2(m2) − U(m1,m2); and U(m1,m2) > 0 as long as firm 2 is still
in contention. Hence, noting that the discount rate is 1, and expressing the worker’s
continuation payoff in flow terms, we see that increasing the amount of time that she
spends training brings forward the time at which her flow payoff drops from F2(m2) to
F2(m2)− U(m1,m2). Doing so is therefore bad from her point of view.
Proof. We have L1,WV = L1,W(F2 − U2) = −L1,WU2, where the last equality follows
from the fact that F2 is independent of m1. The result therefore follows at once from
Theorem 14.
Remark. Theorem 14 tells us that the non-employer would like to see more training by
the employer, whereas Corollary 15 tells us that the worker would like to see less. This
inverse relationship is an instance of a more general feature of the stochastic learning-by-
doing model: as far as any activity undertaken by the employer is concerned, the interests
of the non-employer and the worker are diametrically opposed.
To summarize, firm 2 likes training when it takes the form of accelerated learning, and
this implies that training is socially underprovided – and turnover is inefficiently low – in
this case.
6.2. The Accelerated Productivity Enhancement Model (APEM). In the
APEM, the marginal joint payoff to firm 1 and the worker of having the worker work
a little less and train a little more in firm 1 is
− (γ′1(1− a1)m1 + 1r L1,WF1)+ (−κ1 + 1r L1,TF1) .
On the other hand, the marginal joint payoff to all three players of having the worker
work a little less and train a little more in firm 1 is
− (γ′1(1− a1)m1 + 1r L1,WG)+ (−κ1 + 1r L1,TG) .
Hence, corner solutions aside, training is overprovided in equilibrium iff the former exceeds
the latter, i.e. iff
−1
r
L1,WF1 +
1
r
L1,TF1 ≥ −1r L1,WG+ 1r L1,TG
or
(λ− 1) 1
r
µ1,W
∂F1
∂m1
≥ (λ− 1) 1
r
µ1,W
∂G
∂m1
.
Firm-Specific Training 30
This in turn is equivalent to
1
r
µ1,W
∂U2
∂m1
≤ 0. (10)
That is, corner solutions aside, training is overprovided iff the shadow value to firm 2 of
productivity enhancement in firm 1 is negative.
Our first result implies that inequality (10) does indeed hold in the APEM. Further-
more it tells us precisely when it holds as a strict inequality.
Theorem 16. ∂U2
∂m1
≤ 0, with strict inequality iff firm 2 is still in contention.
The intuition for this theorem is relatively simple in the case in which the worker is
currently employed by firm 1, which also happens to be the case that we need in order to
show that training is overprovided in the APEM.32 In this case, raising the productivity
of the worker in firm 1 increases the time before she switches employer. Indeed, there
may be some states of the world in which she no longer switches at all. This is bad from
the point of view of firm 2, which is now less likely to reach the point at which it receives
a strictly positive continuation payoff and, if it does ever reach that point, it reaches it
later.
Proof. See Appendix A.9.
Notice that the reason why firm 2 dislikes training is that it lengthens the time that
the worker spends with firm 1. In other words, firm 2 dislikes the reduction in turnover
associated with training. But this means that turnover is once again inefficiently low.
Corollary 17. ∂V
∂m1
≥ 0, with strict inequality iff firm 2 is still in contention.
We give the intuition behind this corollary in the case in which the worker is currently
employed by firm 1.33 As long as she remains with firm 1, her flow payoff is F2(m2),
where m2 is her productivity in firm 2. However, when she switches from firm 1, her flow
32The general case of the theorem is more subtle. However, one observation emerges clearly from the
proof of the theorem: the main driver of the result is the fact that raising the productivity of the worker
in firm 1 increases the wage that firm 2 must pay the worker. This is obviously bad from the point of view
of firm 2. The subtlety lies in the way in which this increase in the wage paid by firm 2 gets aggregated
into a reduction in the payoff of firm 2.
33The general case of the corollary is more subtle. The best way of obtaining some insight into this
case is to construct a direct proof of the corollary. Such a proof shows that the main driver of the result
is the fact that raising the productivity of the worker in firm 1 increases the wage that firm 2 must pay
the worker. This is obviously good from the point of view of the worker. The subtlety lies in the way in
which this increase in the wage gets aggregated into an increase in the payoff of the worker.
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payoff effectively drops from F2(m2) to V (m1,m2) = F2(m2) − U2(m1,m2), where m1 is
her productivity in firm 1 at the time of the switch. Now, increasing the amount of time
that she spends training delays the time at which the switch occurs. Doing so is therefore
good from her point of view.
Proof. We have ∂V
∂m1
= ∂F2
∂m1
− ∂U2
∂m1
= − ∂U2
∂m1
, where the last equality follows from the
fact that F2 is independent of m1. The result therefore follows at once from Theorem 16.
Remark. The inverse relationship between Theorem 16, which tells us that the non-
employer would like to see less training by the employer, and Corollary 17, which tells
us that the worker would like to see more training by the employer, is another instance
of the more general feature of the stochastic learning-by-doing model mentioned in the
remark following Corollary 15 above: as far as any activity undertaken by the employer
is concerned, the interests of the non-employer and the worker are diametrically opposed.
To summarize, firm 2 dislikes training when it takes the form of accelerated produc-
tivity enhancement, and this implies that training is socially overprovided – and turnover
is inefficiently low – in this case.
7. Conclusion
There are good reasons to expect the market to provide workers with the correct incentives
to invest in general training.34 The main question in the context of general training is
therefore whether workers are in a position to respond to those incentives. They may not
be. For example, the most efficient time for a worker to make an investment in general
human capital may be at the outset of her career, when she may not have any financial
resources of her own. If so, then she will need to borrow the resources required to make the
investment. Unfortunately, financial lenders may not be willing to provide these resources,
if the only collateral the worker can offer is her own future labour. Moreover employers
may not be willing to underwrite the investment either, because employment law may
prevent them from writing the long-term contract necessary to recoup their investment.
There may therefore be a case for government intervention, if only partially to reinstate
the market that government itself has eliminated. For example, the government could
offer a training loan to the worker, and use its powers of taxation to recoup the loan once
34See Becker (1993).
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the worker returns to productive employment. There does not, however, appear to be any
case for the direct regulation of employers.
On the other hand, as the analysis of the current paper has shown, there is no reason
to expect the market to provide firms and workers with the correct incentives to invest
in firm-specific training. The main question in this context is therefore whether there is
a case for government intervention to rectify those incentives.
There are at least two obstacles to such intervention. First, while we do not have a
formal result to this effect, a comparison between the two special cases of our stochastic
learning-by-doing model suggests that training tends to be overprovided when the rate
of acceleration of productivity enhancement is large relative to the rate of acceleration
of employee evaluation, and underprovided when the rate of acceleration of productivity
enhancement is small relative to the rate of acceleration of employee evaluation. Which of
these two effects of training dominates in practice is an empirical question. Therefore, in
order to determine whether firm-specific training is underprovided or overprovided, it is
necessary to identify the productivity-enhancement and employee-evaluation components
of training. This is a difficult problem. For one thing, as we have seen above, the standard
assumption – namely that a worker’s productivity can be identified with her wage – is not
correct in a context in which human capital is firm specific.35 Moreover, identifying the
mean and variance of changes in a worker’s productivity is even more challenging than
identifying her productivity as such.
Second, even if it is possible to identify the two components of firm-specific training,
any policy intervention designed to rectify the inefficiency in the provision of such training
is likely to encounter opposition from workers. Indeed, as we show in Corollary 15 above,
if the employee-evaluation component of training predominates, then: although training is
already underprovided, workers would prefer to see less training. They will therefore resist
a policy designed to increase training. Similarly, as we show in Corollary 17 above, if the
productivity-enhancement component of training predominates, then: although training
35Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) explicitly address the problem of identifying the worker’s productivity
in a world where the worker’s wage differs from her marginal productivity. In particular, they analyze and
estimate a model with heterogeneous workers and firms. Workers do not accumulate any human capital
during their life cycle, but progressively learn about their alternative job opportunities while on the job.
Whenever a worker receives a new offer, she might either accept it or renegotiate her wage with her current
employer. In equilibrium, the worker’s wage is then her outside option given the sequence of offers she has
received up to that point in time. The wage is therefore a lower bound to the worker’s productivity in her
current employment. Using the identifying restrictions imposed by their theoretical model, Postel-Vinay
and Robin estimate a structural model and explicitly identify the worker’s productivity within a match.
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is already overprovided, workers would prefer to see more training. They will therefore
resist a policy designed to decrease training.
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A. Appendix
A.1. Trembles in the Constituent Game. Suppose that we are given a small ε > 0
and a large C <∞ such that:
1. If the worker decides to work for firm k then, with probability ε, she will tremble
when executing her choice and pick firm 3− k instead.
2. Wages are bounded below by −C.
Then the set of subgame-perfect equilibria of this perturbed game converges, as ε ↓ 0,
to the cautious equilibrium of the original game. This approach does capture the basic
idea of the simple economic argument above, namely that there is a risk that the offer of
the non-employer will be accepted. It is, however, somewhat clumsy: the non-employer
knows that its offer will be accepted with probability ε. It therefore has an incentive to
make the very low wage offer w2 = −C. Indeed, that is why we need to add the lower
bound −C.
A.2. Probabilistic Choice in the Constituent Game. An alternative foundation
can be obtained by having the worker make a probabilistic choice. Suppose that we are
given a small ε > 0 and that – when faced with the two contracts (w1, a1) and (w2, a2) –
the worker chooses firm 1 with probability proportional to
exp
(
ε−1
(
w1 +
1
r
L1,a1V
))
and firm 2 with probability proportional to
exp
(
ε−1
(
w2 +
1
r
L2,a2V
))
.
In particular: the probability of choosing firm 1 depends only on
∆ =
(
w1 +
1
r
L1,a1V
)− (w2 + 1r L2,a2V ) ;
it is 1
2
when ∆ = 0; and it converges exponentially (at the very fast rate ε−1) to 1 as ∆
goes to +∞ and to 0 as ∆ goes to −∞. Then, for ε sufficiently small, there is a unique
Nash equilibrium of the resulting two-firm game. Moreover this equilibrium converges, as
ε ↓ 0, to the cautious equilibrium of the original game. This approach captures the simple
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economic argument rather better than the trembling-hand approach: it is only when her
payoffs from the two offers are very close that there is a significant risk that the worker
will choose the lower offer.
A.3. Proof of Theorem 4. Recall from the text preceding Theorem 4 that
a∗1 = argmax
a˜1
{
pi1,a˜1 +
1
r
L1,a˜1(U1 + V )
}
,
a∗2 = argmax
a˜2
{
pi2,a˜2 +
1
r
L2,a˜2(U2 + V )
}
and
S = U1 + U2 + V.
Then:
Lemma 18. The constituent game has a cautious equilibrium in which firm 1 is the
employer iff
pi1,a∗1 +
1
r
L1,a∗1S ≥ pi2,a∗2 + 1r L2,a∗2S. (11)
In any such equilibrium, we have
a1 = a
∗
1,
a2 = a
∗
2,
w1 = pi2,a∗2 +
1
r
L2,a∗2(U2 + V )− 1r L1,a∗1(U2 + V ),
w2 = pi2,a∗2 +
1
r
L2,a∗2U2 − 1r L1,a∗1U2.
Here: a∗1 is the training offer that maximizes the joint payoff of firm 1 and the worker;
a∗2 is the training offer that maximizes the joint payoff of firm 2 and the worker; and S is
the joint continuation-value function of all three players. The first part of the lemma then
tells us that there exists a cautious equilibrium of the constituent game in which firm 1 is
the employer iff, taking the offers a∗1 and a
∗
2 as given, the joint payoff of all three players
is higher when the worker works/trains for firm 1 than it would be if the worker instead
worked/trained for firm 2. Furthermore, in any such equilibrium: the training offers a1
and a2 coincide with a
∗
1 and a
∗
2; w1 is equal to the joint payoff that firm 2 and the worker
would obtain if the worker instead worked/trained for firm 2, less the joint discounted
shadow value to firm 2 and the worker of the learning that occurs in firm 1; and w2 is
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equal to the gross payoff that firm 2 would obtain if the worker instead worked/trained
for firm 2, less the discounted shadow value to firm 2 of the learning that occurs in firm
1.
Proof. Consider a cautious equilibrium of the constituent game in which firm 1 is the
employer. Suppose first that firm 2’s offer (w2, a2) is given, and consider firm 1’s offer
(w1, a1). The worker will be willing to accept this offer if and only if
w1 +
1
r
L1,a1V ≥ w2 + 1r L2,a2V, (12)
i.e. if and only if the value that she places on firm 1’s offer is at least as high as the value
that she places on firm 2’s offer. In that case, the payoff to firm 1 is
pi1,a1 − w1 + 1r L1,a1U1. (13)
Now, at the very minimum, firm 1’s offer must maximize her payoff among all those offers
that will be accepted by the worker. Hence, holding a1 fixed, w1 must maximize (13)
subject to the constraint (12). This yields
w1 = w2 +
1
r
L2,a2V − 1r L1,a1V.
Furthermore, with this choice of w1, (13) becomes
pi1,a1 +
1
r
L1,a1(U1 + V )− w2 − 1r L2,a2V.
This in turn is maximized by choosing a1 = a
∗
1, where
a∗1 = argmax
a1
{
pi1,a1 +
1
r
L1,a1(U1 + V )
}
. (14)
With this choice of a1, our expression for w1 becomes
w1 = w2 +
1
r
L2,a2V − 1r L1,a∗1V. (15)
Finally, firm 1’s best winning offer must be at least as good as making a losing offer.
Hence
pi1,a∗1 +
1
r
L1,a∗1(U1 + V )− w2 − 1r L2,a2V ≥ 1r L2,a2U1. (16)
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Suppose second that firm 1’s offer (w1, a1) is given, and consider firm 2’s offer (w2, a2).
As in the previous paragraph, we see that firm 2’s best winning offer (w2, a2) is obtained
by choosing a2 = a
∗
2, where
a∗2 = argmax
a2
{
pi2,a2 +
1
r
L2,a2(U2 + V )
}
,
and by putting
w2 = w1 +
1
r
L1,a1V − 1r L2,a∗2V.
This yields a payoff of
pi2,a∗2 +
1
r
L2,a∗2(U2 + V )− w1 − 1r L1,a1V.
However, this best winning offer must be no better for firm 2 than losing. Hence
pi2,a∗2 +
1
r
L2,a∗2(U2 + V )− w1 − 1r L1,a1V ≤ 1r L1,a1U2. (17)
Suppose third that (w1, a1) and (w2, a2) are the cautious-equilibrium offers of firms 1
and 2. Since firm 2 would be willing to go through with its offer if it were accepted, we
have
pi2,a2 − w2 + 1r L2,a2U2 ≥ 1r L1,a∗1U2. (18)
Hence
pi2,a2 +
1
r
L2,a2U2 − 1r L1,a∗1U2 ≥ w2
(on rearranging (18))
≥ pi2,a∗2 + 1r L2,a∗2(U2 + V )− 1r L1,a∗1U2 − 1r L2,a2V
(using (15) and (14) to substitute for w1 and a1 in (17) and rearranging)
≥ pi2,a2 + 1r L2,a2(U2 + V )− 1r L1,a∗1U2 − 1r L2,a2V
(by definition of a∗2)
= pi2,a2 +
1
r
L2,a2U2 − 1r L1,a∗1U2
(on simplifying).
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In other words, we have obtained a chain of inequalities, the beginning and end of
which are identical. It follows that all the inequalities must in fact hold as equalities. In
particular, we have
w2 = pi2,a2 +
1
r
L2,a2U2 − 1r L1,a∗1U2 (19)
and
pi2,a2 +
1
r
L2,a2(U2 + V ) = pi2,a∗2 +
1
r
L2,a∗2(U2 + V ) (20)
(from the first and third inequalities respectively). Now, equality (20) implies that
a2 = a
∗
2.
Substituting for a2 in equality (19), we therefore obtain an expression for w2, namely
w2 = pi2,a∗2 +
1
r
L2,a∗2U2 − 1r L1,a∗1U2.
By the same token, substituting for a2 and w2 in equality (15), we obtain an expression
for w1, namely
w1 = pi2,a∗2 +
1
r
L2,a∗2(U2 + V )− 1r L1,a∗1(U2 + V ).
Finally, substituting for a2 and w2 in (16) and rearranging, we obtain (11).
It remains only to show that, if (11) holds, then there exists a cautious equilibrium in
which firm 1 is the employer. But it is easy to construct such an equilibrium using the
formulae above, so we omit the details.
In the light of Lemma 18, we see that the cautious-equilibrium training offers a1 and a2
are unique. This is because they are given by the same formula irrespective of which firm
is the employer. However, it is not immediately clear whether the cautious-equilibrium
wage offers w1 and w2 are unique. This is because the formulae for w1 and w2 change
when the employer changes. Similarly, it is not immediately clear whether the payoffs of
the three players are unique. The next Lemma settles these questions in the affirmative.
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Lemma 19. Let a∗1, a
∗
2 and S be defined as in Lemma 18. Put
w∗1,1 = pi2,a∗2 +
1
r
L2,a∗2S − 1r L2,a∗2U1 − 1r L1,a∗1(U2 + V ),
w∗1,2 = pi1,a∗1 +
1
r
L1,a∗1S − 1r L2,a∗2U1 − 1r L1,a∗1(U2 + V ),
w∗2,1 = pi2,a∗2 +
1
r
L2,a∗2S − 1r L1,a∗1U2 − 1r L2,a∗2(U1 + V ),
w∗2,2 = pi1,a∗1 +
1
r
L1,a∗1S − 1r L1,a∗1U2 − 1r L2,a∗2(U1 + V ).
Then, in any cautious equilibrium of the constituent game, we have:
w1 = min
{
w∗1,1, w
∗
1,2
}
,
w2 = min
{
w∗2,1, w
∗
2,2
}
.
Furthermore, the payoffs of firm 1, firm 2 and the worker can be written
max
{(
pi1,a∗1 +
1
r
L1,a∗1S
)− (pi2,a∗2 + 1r L2,a∗2S) , 0}+ 1r L2,a∗2U1,
max
{(
pi2,a∗2 +
1
r
L2,a∗2S
)− (pi1,a∗1 + 1r L1,a∗1S) , 0}+ 1r L1,a∗1U2,
min
{
pi1,a∗1 +
1
r
L1,a∗1S, pi2,a∗2 +
1
r
L2,a∗2S
}− 1
r
L2,a∗2U1 − 1r L1,a∗1U2.
In other words, there are two candidates for w1, namely w
∗
1,1 and w
∗
1,2. The first of
these, namely w∗1,1, is the wage offered by firm 1 in a cautious equilibrium in which firm 1
is the employer. It is made up of three components: the joint payoff pi2,a∗2 +
1
r
L2,a∗2S to the
three players if firm 2 is the employer; less the discounted shadow value 1
r
L2,a∗2U1 to firm
1 of the learning that takes place in firm 2 if firm 2 is the employer; less the discounted
joint shadow value 1
r
L1,a∗1(U2 + V ) to firm 2 and the worker of the learning that takes
place in firm 1 if firm 1 is the employer. Similarly, w∗1,2 is the wage offered by firm 1 in
a cautious equilibrium in which firm 2 is the employer. Like w∗1,1, it is made up of three
components. The first of these is the joint payoff pi1,a∗1 +
1
r
L1,a∗1S to the three players if
firm 1 is the employer. The remaining two are the same as for w∗1,1. Analogous remarks
apply to w2, w
∗
2,2 and w
∗
2,1.
Furthermore, the cautious-equilibrium payoff of firm 1 has two parts: (i) its outside
option 1
r
L2,a∗2U1, which is the discounted shadow value to it of the learning that will occur
if the worker is employed by firm 2; and (ii) the difference between the joint payoff of all
three players when firm 1 is the employer and the joint payoff of all three players when firm
2 is the employer. In other words, firm 1 gets its outside option plus its net contribution
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to the grand payoff. Analogous remarks apply to the cautious-equilibrium payoff of firm
2. As for the worker, there are three components to her cautious-equilibrium payoff: (i)
the minimum of the joint payoff of all three players when firm 1 is the employer and the
joint payoff of all three players when firm 2 is the employer; (ii) minus the discounted
shadow value to firm 1 of the learning that will occur if the worker is employed by firm
2; and (iii) minus the discounted shadow value to firm 2 of the learning that will occur if
the worker is employed by firm 1. In other words, she gets as much of the grand payoff
as is consistent with wage competition between the two firms, less the sum of the outside
options of the two firms.
Proof. Note first that
w∗1,1 = pi2,a∗2 +
1
r
L2,a∗2S − 1r L2,a∗2U1 − 1r L1,a∗1(U2 + V )
= pi2,a∗2 +
1
r
L2,a∗2(U2 + V )− 1r L1,a∗1(U2 + V ).
I.e. w∗1,1 is the wage offered by firm 1 in any cautious equilibrium in which it is the
employer. (Cf. the formula for w1 in the statement of Lemma 18.) Similarly,
w∗1,2 = pi1,a∗1 +
1
r
L1,a∗1S − 1r L1,a∗1(U2 + V )− 1r L2,a∗2U1
= pi1,a∗1 +
1
r
L1,a∗1U1 − 1r L2,a∗2U1.
I.e. w∗1,2 is the wage offered by firm 1 in any cautious equilibrium in which firm 2 is the
employer. (Cf. the formula for w2 in the statement of Lemma 18.) Furthermore it follows
directly from the formulae for w∗1,1 and w
∗
1,2 that: w
∗
1,1 ≤ w∗1,2 iff
pi1,a∗1 +
1
r
L1,a∗1S ≥ pi2,a∗2 + 1r L2,a∗2S,
i.e. (11) holds; and w∗1,2 ≤ w∗1,1 iff
pi2,a∗2 +
1
r
L2,a∗2S ≥ pi1,a∗1 + 1r L1,a∗1S, (21)
i.e. the analogue of (11) for firm 2 holds. Hence w1 = min
{
w∗1,1, w
∗
1,2
}
, as required.
Analogous reasoning applies to w∗2,2, w
∗
2,1 and w2.
Next, it follows from the proof of Lemma 18 that the cautious-equilibrium payoff of
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firm 1 is the maximum of the payoff
pi1,a∗1 +
1
r
L1,a∗1(U1 + V )− w2 − 1r L2,a∗2V
from its best winning offer and the payoff
1
r
L2,a∗2U1
from a losing offer. Bearing in mind that
w2 = min
{
w∗2,1, w
∗
2,2
}
= min
{
pi2,a∗2 +
1
r
L2,a∗2S − 1r L2,a∗2(U1 + V )− 1r L1,a∗1U2,
pi1,a∗1 +
1
r
L1,a∗1S − 1r L2,a∗2(U1 + V )− 1r L1,a∗1U2
}
= min
{
pi2,a∗2 +
1
r
L2,a∗2S, pi1,a∗1 +
1
r
L1,a∗1S
}− 1
r
L2,a∗2(U1 + V )− 1r L1,a∗1U2,
it follows that the payoff of firm 1 is
max
{
pi1,a∗1 +
1
r
L1,a∗1(U1 + V )− w2 − 1r L2,a∗2V, 1r L2,a∗2U1
}
= max
{
pi1,a∗1 +
1
r
L1,a∗1(U1 + V )− w2 − 1r L2,a∗2(U1 + V ), 0
}
+ 1
r
L2,a∗2U1
= max
{
pi1,a∗1 +
1
r
L1,a∗1S −min
{
pi2,a∗2 +
1
r
L2,a∗2S, pi1,a∗1 +
1
r
L1,a∗1S
}
, 0
}
+ 1
r
L2,a∗2U1
= max
{(
pi1,a∗1 +
1
r
L1,a∗1S
)− (pi2,a∗2 + 1r L2,a∗2S) , 0}+ 1r L2,a∗2U1.
Similarly, the payoff of firm 2 is
max
{(
pi2,a∗2 +
1
r
L2,a∗2S
)− (pi1,a∗1 + 1r L1,a∗1S) , 0}+ 1r L1,a∗1U2.
Finally, the payoff of the worker is w∗1,1 +
1
r
L1,a∗1V when firm 1 is the employer and
w∗2,2 +
1
r
L2,a∗2V when firm 2 is the employer. But
w∗1,1 +
1
r
L1,a∗1V = pi2,a∗2 +
1
r
L2,a∗2(U2 + V )− 1r L1,a∗1U2
= pi2,a∗2 +
1
r
L2,a∗2S − 1r L2,a∗2U1 − 1r L1,a∗1U2
and, by the same token,
w∗2,2 +
1
r
L2,a∗2V = pi1,a∗1 +
1
r
L1,a∗1S − 1r L2,a∗2U1 − 1r L1,a∗1U2.
Firm-Specific Training 43
Hence, bearing in mind (11) and (21), the cautious-equilibrium payoff of the worker is
min
{
pi1,a∗1 +
1
r
L1,a∗1S, pi2,a∗2 +
1
r
L2,a∗2S
}− 1
r
L2,a∗2U1 − 1r L1,a∗1U2.
Theorem 4 now follows from the formulae for the payoffs of firm 1, firm 2 and the
worker obtained in Lemma 19.
A.4. Proof of Theorem 6. Combining Definition 5 with Theorem 4, we see that the
Bellman system of the dynamic game can be written
U1 =
1
r
L2,a∗2U1 + max
{(
pi1,a∗1 +
1
r
L1,a∗1S
)− (pi2,a∗2 + 1r L2,a∗2S) , 0} , (22)
U2 =
1
r
L1,a∗1U2 + max
{(
pi2,a∗2 +
1
r
L2,a∗2S
)− (pi1,a∗1 + 1r L1,a∗1S) , 0} , (23)
V = min
{
pi1,a∗1 +
1
r
L1,a∗1S, pi2,a∗2 +
1
r
L2,a∗2S
}− 1
r
L2,a∗2U1 − 1r L1,a∗1U2, (24)
where
a∗1 = argmax
a˜1
{
pi1,a˜1 +
1
r
L1,a˜1(U1 + V )
}
,
a∗2 = argmax
a˜2
{
pi2,a˜2 +
1
r
L2,a˜2(U2 + V )
}
and S = U1 + U2 + V .
We begin by showing that, if F1, F2, G, A1 and A2 are constructed using the procedure
given in the statement of the Theorem, and if U1 = G − F2, U2 = G − F1 and V =
F1 + F2 − G, then U1, U2 and V satisfy (22-24). The first step is to show that the a∗1
constructed from U1, U2 and V is equal to A1. We have
a∗1 = argmax
a˜1
{
pi1,a˜1 +
1
r
L1,a˜1(U1 + V )
}
= argmax
a˜1
{
pi1,a˜1 +
1
r
L1,a˜1F1
}
(since U1 + V = (G− F2) + (F1 + F2 −G) = F1)
= A1
(from Step 2 of the procedure). By the same token, a∗2 = A2.
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The second step is to show that (22) is satisfied. We have
max
{(
pi1,a∗1 +
1
r
L1,a∗1S
)− (pi2,a∗2 + 1r L2,a∗2S) , 0}+ 1r L2,a∗2U1
(which is the RHS of (22))
= max
{(
pi1,a∗1 +
1
r
L1,a∗1G
)− (pi2,a∗2 + 1r L2,a∗2G) , 0}+ 1r L2,a∗2(G− F2)
(since S = U1 + U2 + V = (G− F2) + (G− F1) + (F1 + F2 −G) = G and U1 = G− F2)
= max
{
pi1,a∗1 +
1
r
L1,a∗1G, pi2,a∗2 +
1
r
L2,a∗2G
}− (pi2,a∗2 + 1r L2,a∗2F2)
(rearranging)
= max
{
pi1,A1 +
1
r
L1,A1G, pi2,A2 +
1
r
L2,A2G
}− (pi2,A2 + 1r L2,A2F2)
(since a∗i = Ai)
= G− F2
(by Step 3 of the procedure in the case of the first term and by Steps 1 and 2 of the
procedure in the case of the second term)
= U1
(which is the LHS of (22)). By the same token, (23) is satisfied.
The third and final step is to show that (24) is satisfied. We have
min
{
pi1,a∗1 +
1
r
L1,a∗1S, pi2,a∗2 +
1
r
L2,a∗2S
}− 1
r
L2,a∗2U1 − 1r L1,a∗1U2
= max
{
pi1,a∗1 +
1
r
L1,a∗1S, pi2,a∗2 +
1
r
L2,a∗2S
}
−max{(pi1,a∗1 + 1r L1,a∗1S)− (pi2,a∗2 + 1r L2,a∗2S) , 0}
−max{(pi2,a∗2 + 1r L2,a∗2S)− (pi1,a∗1 + 1r L1,a∗1S) , 0}− 1r L2,a∗2U1 − 1r L1,a∗1U2
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(using the formula min {x, y} = max {x, y} −max {x− y, 0} −max {y − x, 0})
= max
{
pi1,a∗1 +
1
r
L1,a∗1S, pi2,a∗2 +
1
r
L2,a∗2S
}
− (U1 − 1r L2,a∗2U1)− (U2 − 1r L1,a∗1U2)
− 1
r
L2,a∗2U1 − 1r L1,a∗1U2
(using (22) and (23))
= S − U1 − U2
(using the fact that max
{
pi1,a∗1 +
1
r
L1,a∗1S, pi2,a∗2 +
1
r
L2,a∗2S
}
= S, which can easily be
derived using ideas from the second step, and rearranging)
= V
(by definition of S).
We now show that, if U1, U2 and V satisfy (22-24), and if we put F1 = U1 + V ,
F2 = U2 + V , G = U1 + U2 + V ,
A1 = argmax
a˜1
{
pi1,a˜1 +
1
r
L1,a˜1(U1 + V )
}
and
A2 = argmax
a˜2
{
pi2,a˜2 +
1
r
L2,a˜2(U2 + V )
}
,
then F1, F2, G, A1 and A2 are the functions generated by the procedure.
The first step is to show that F1 solves the Bellman equation in Step 1 of the procedure.
We have
F1 = U1 + V
(by construction of F1)
= max
{(
pi1,a∗1 +
1
r
L1,a∗1S
)− (pi2,a∗2 + 1r L2,a∗2S) , 0}
+ min
{
pi1,a∗1 +
1
r
L1,a∗1S, pi2,a∗2 +
1
r
L2,a∗2S
}
− 1
r
L1,a∗1U2
(by (22) and (23))
=
(
pi1,a∗1 +
1
r
L1,a∗1S
)− 1
r
L1,a∗1U2
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(using the formula max {x− y, 0}+ min {x, y} = x)
= pi1,a∗1 +
1
r
L1,a∗1(U1 + V )
(rearranging)
= max
a˜1
{
pi1,a˜1 +
1
r
L1,a˜1(U1 + V )
}
(by definition of a∗1)
= max
a˜1
{
pi1,a˜1 +
1
r
L1,a˜1F1
}
(by construction of F1). By the same token, F2 solves the Bellman equation in Step 1 of
the procedure.
The second step is to show that A1 = a
∗
1. We have
A1 = argmax
a˜1
{
pi1,a˜1 +
1
r
L1,a˜1F1
}
(as required in Step 2 of the procedure)
= argmax
a˜1
{
pi1,a˜1 +
1
r
L1,a˜1(U1 + V )
}
(by construction of F1)
= a∗1
(by definition of a∗1). By the same token, A2 = a
∗
2.
The third and final step is to show that G solves the Bellman equation in Step 3 of
the procedure. We have
G = U1 + U2 + V
(by construction of G)
= max
{(
pi1,a∗1 +
1
r
L1,a∗1S
)− (pi2,a∗2 + 1r L2,a∗2S) , 0}
+ max
{(
pi2,a∗2 +
1
r
L2,a∗2S
)− (pi1,a∗1 + 1r L1,a∗1S) , 0}
+ min
{
pi1,a∗1 +
1
r
L1,a∗1S, pi2,a∗2 +
1
r
L2,a∗2S
}
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(using all three of the equations of the Bellman system)
= max
{
pi1,a∗1 +
1
r
L1,a∗1S, pi2,a∗2 +
1
r
L2,a∗2S
}
(using the formula max {x− y, 0}+ max {y − x, 0}+ min {x, y} = max {x, y})
= max
{
pi1,A1 +
1
r
L1,A1G, pi2,A2 +
1
r
L2,A2G
}
(because Ai = a
∗
i and S = G).
A.5. Proof of Corollary 7. In order to establish existence, we use the procedure in
the statement of the theorem to construct functions F1, F2, G, A1 and A2. We then put
U1 = G−F2, U2 = G−F1 and V = F1 +F2−G. The latter satisfy the Bellman system of
the dynamic game, which gives us the required existence. In order to establish uniqueness,
we begin from any solution U1, U2 and V of the Bellman system of the dynamic game. We
then define functions F1, F2, G, A1 and A2 using the formulae F1 = U1 +V , F2 = U2 +V ,
G = U1 + U2 + V ,
A1 = argmax
a˜1
{
pi1,a˜1 +
1
r
L1,a˜1(U1 + V )
}
and
A2 = argmax
a˜2
{
pi2,a˜2 +
1
r
L2,a˜2(U2 + V )
}
,
Since these functions are the functions produced by the procedure, they must be unique.
But then U1, U2 and V must also be unique, since they can be expressed in terms of F1,
F2 and G using the formulae U1 = G− F2, U2 = G− F1 and V = F1 + F2 −G.
A.6. Proof of Theorem 8. The proof of Theorem 6 shows that a∗1 = A1 and a
∗
2 = A2.
As for w∗1,1, we have
w∗1,1 = pi2,a∗2 +
1
r
L2,a∗2S − 1r L2,a∗2U1 − 1r L1,a∗1(U2 + V )
(as in the statement of Lemma 19)
= pi2,A2 +
1
r
L2,A2G− 1r L2,A2(G− F2)− 1r L1,A1F2
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(substituting for S, U1, U2, V , a
∗
1 and a
∗
2)
= pi2,A2 +
1
r
L2,A2F2 − 1r L1,A1F2
(rearranging)
= F2 − 1r L1,A1F2
(since F2 satisfies (6) for k = 2)
= F2
(since the pairwise value function F2 necessarily depends only on m2, whereas L1,A1 in-
volves only derivatives w.r.t. m1). Similarly,
w∗1,2 = pi1,a∗1 +
1
r
L1,a∗1S − 1r L2,a∗2U1 − 1r L1,a∗1(U2 + V )
= pi1,A1 +
1
r
L1,A1G− 1r L2,A2(G− F2)− 1r L1,A1F2
= pi2,A2 +
1
r
L2,A2F2 − 1r L1,A1F2 +
(
pi1,A1 +
1
r
L1,A1G
)− (pi2,A2 + 1r L2,A2G)
= F2 +
(
pi1,A1 +
1
r
L1,A1G
)− (pi2,A2 + 1r L2,A2G) .
The arguments for firm 2 are analogous.
A.7. Proof of Theorem 10. We begin by introducing three functions. For all
δ ∈ [m1,m1 ), the function Q0 = Q0(m1; δ) takes the value 0 on [m1, δ ] and solves
the differential equation
Q0 = pi1,A1 +
1
r
L1,A1Q0
on ( δ,m1 ]. For all δ ∈ [m1,m1 ), the function Q1 = Q1(m1; δ) takes the value 1 on [m1, δ ]
and solves the differential equation
Q1 =
1
r
L1,A1Q1
on ( δ,m1 ]. Finally, the function Q = Q(m1; δ, b) is given by the formula
Q = Q0 + bQ1.
The main idea of the proof is then to show that there is a unique b = B(δ) such that
Q′(δ+; δ, b) = Q′0(δ+; δ) + bQ
′
1(δ+; δ) = 0.
To see that there is such a b, note first that Q1 > 0 on [ δ,m1 ) (with Q1 = 0 at m1),
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that Q′1 < 0 on ( δ,m1 ), and that Q
′′
1 > 0 on ( δ,m1 ). In particular,
Q′1(δ+; δ) < 0.
Second, we have
Q(m1; δ, F1(δ)) =
{
F1(δ) for all m1 ∈ [m1, δ ]
F1 for all m1 ∈ ( δ,m1 ]
}
. (25)
In particular,
F ′1(δ) = Q
′(δ+; δ, F1(δ)) = Q′0(δ+; δ) + F1(δ)Q
′
1(δ+; δ);
and therefore
Q′0(δ+; δ) = F
′
1(δ)− F1(δ)Q′1(δ+; δ) > 0.
Hence: (i) Q′(δ+; δ, 0) > 0; and (ii) Q′(δ+; δ, b) is strictly decreasing in b for b ∈
(0, F1(m1)). It can also be shown that Q
′(δ+; δ, F1(m1)) < 0. Hence there does indeed
exist a unique b ∈ (0, F1(m1)) such that Q′(δ+; δ, b) = 0, namely
b = F1(δ)− F
′
1(δ)
Q′1(δ+; δ)
.
This b depends continuously on δ ∈ (m1,m1 ), since F ′1(δ) and Q′1(δ+; δ) both do.
Next, in view of equation (25), we have
Q0(m1; δ) = F1 − F1(δ)Q1(m1; δ)
for all m1 ∈ [ δ,m1 ]. Hence
Q(m1; δ, b) = F1 + (b− F1(δ))Q1(m1; δ)
for all m1 ∈ [ δ,m1 ]. Now, by construction of B(δ), we have Q′(δ+; δ, B(δ)) = 0. More-
over: B(δ) > F1(δ) (since Q
′(δ+; δ, F1(δ)) > 0); Q′′1 > 0 on ( δ,m1 ); and F1 is convex on
the whole of [m1,m1 ]. Hence Q
′′(m1; δ, B(δ)) > 0 for all m1 ∈ ( δ,m1 ). It follows that
Q( · ; δ, B(δ)) = R1( · ;B(δ)). That is: Q( · ; δ, B(δ)) is the value function of the retirement
problem with lump sum B(δ); and δ is the cutoff in this retirement problem.
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Finally putting ∆1 = B
−1, we see that R1(m1, b) = b iff m1 ≤ ∆1(b). Hence
Γ1(m1) = min {b | b ∈ R, m1 ≤ ∆1(b)}
= min {b | b ∈ R, B(m1) ≤ b}
= B(m1).
This completes the proof.
A.8. Proof of Lemma 13. By construction of G, we have
G = max
k
{
pik,Ak +
1
r
Lk,AkG
} ≥ pi1,A1 + 1r L1,A1G,
with strict inequality iff Γ2 > Γ1. Moreover, by construction of F1,
F1 = pi1,A1 +
1
r
L1,A1F1.
Hence, subtracting the second relation from the first, we obtain
G− F1 ≥ 1r L1,A1(G− F1)
or
U2 ≥ 1r L1,A1U2,
with strict inequality iff Γ2 > Γ1. More explicitly, putting
g = U2 − 1r L1,A1U2,
we have
1
r
L1,A1U2 − U2 + g = 0,
where g > 0 iff Γ2 > Γ1.
Now, the operator L1,A1 describes the horizontal evolution of m1 when firm 1 and the
worker operate as a team. Furthermore, holding m2 fixed, the locus of points m1 for
which Γ2 > Γ1 is an interval of the form [m1,m1 ] ∩ (−∞, c). Hence, continuing to hold
m2 fixed, U2 > 0 iff: either (i) c > m1 (so that g > 0 on the whole of [m1,m1 ]); or (ii)
c ∈ (m1,m1 ) (so that g > 0 on a non-trivial subset of [m1,m1 ]) and m1 < m1 (so that
there is a strictly positive probability that the dynamics of the team problem will spend
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a strictly positive amount of time in the interval [m1, c ) where g > 0). In a word, U2 > 0
iff firm 2 is still in contention.
A.9. Proof of Theorem 16. Let pi, µ, Σ be defined by the formulae pi(k,m) =
pik,Ak(mk)(mk), µ(k,m) = µk,Ak(mk)(mk) and Σ(k,m) = Σk,Ak(mk)(mk), and let the operator
Lk,m be given by the formula
Lk,mH(m) = µ(k,m)
∂H
∂mk
(m) + 1
2
Σ(k,m) ∂
2H
∂m2k
(m).
Then we have
U2 = max
{(
pi(2,m) + 1
r
L2,mG
)− (pi(1,m) + 1
r
L1,mG
)
, 0
}
+ 1
r
L1,mU2
(by the second equation of the Bellman system of the dynamic game, namely (23))
= max
{(
pi(2,m) + 1
r
L2,m(U2 + F1)
)− (pi(1,m) + 1
r
L1,mF1
)
, 1
r
L1,mU2
}
(taking the term 1
r
L1,mU2 inside the maximum and noting that G = U2 + F1)
= max
{(
pi(2,m) + 1
r
L2,mU2
)− F1, 1r L1,mU2}
(since L2,mF1 = 0 and pi(1,m) +
1
r
L1,mF1 = F1). Hence, differentiating with respect to
m1 and putting Û2 =
∂U2
∂m1
, we obtain
Û2 =
1
r
L2,mÛ2 +
∂pi
∂m1
(2,m) + 1
r
(
∂µ
∂m1
(2,m) ∂U2
∂m2
+ 1
2
∂Σ
∂m1
(2,m) ∂
2U2
∂m22
)
− ∂F1
∂m1
= 1
r
L2,mÛ2 − ∂F1∂m1
if pi(2,m) + 1
r
L2,mG > pi(1,m) +
1
r
L1,mG (because
∂pi
∂m1
(2,m) = ∂µ
∂m1
(2,m) = ∂Σ
∂m1
(2,m) =
0); and we obtain
Û2 =
1
r
L1,mÛ2 +
1
r
(
∂µ
∂m1
(1,m) ∂U2
∂m1
+ 1
2
∂Σ
∂m1
(1,m) ∂
2U2
∂m21
)
= 1
r
∂µ
∂m1
(1,m) Û2 +
1
r
(
µ(1,m) + 1
2
∂Σ
∂m1
(1,m)
)
∂Û2
∂m1
+ 1
2 r
Σ(1,m) ∂
2Û2
∂m21
or (
1− 1
r
∂µ
∂m1
(1,m
)
Û2 =
1
r
(
µ(1,m) + 1
2
∂Σ
∂m1
(1,m)
)
∂Û2
∂m1
+ 1
2 r
Σ(1,m) ∂
2Û2
∂m21
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if pi(1,m) + 1
r
L1,mG > pi(2,m) +
1
r
L2,mG.
36
In other words, for all x ∈ [m1,m1 ]× [m2,m2 ], we have the representation
Û2(x) = E
[∫ ∞
0
exp
(
−
∫ t
0
α(m(s)) ds
)
β(m(t)) dt
]
,
where: m(0) = x; dm(t) is distributed normally with mean ζ(m(t)) dt and variance
η(m(t)) dt;
α = 1− 1
r
∂µ
∂m1
(1,m), β = 0, ζ = 1
r
(
µ(1,m) + 1
2
∂Σ
∂m1
(1,m)
)
, η = 1
r
Σ(1,m)
if pi(1,m) + 1
r
L1,mG > pi(2,m) +
1
r
L2,mG; and
α = 1, β = − ∂F1
∂m1
, ζ = 1
r
µ(2,m), η = 1
r
Σ(2,m)
if pi(2,m) + 1
r
L2,mG > pi(1,m) +
1
r
L1,mG.
Now, α is locally bounded. (It may in principle be negative.) Hence the cumulative
discount rate ∫ t
0
α(m(s)) ds
is well defined. (It too may in principle be negative.) Hence the discount factor
exp
(
−
∫ t
0
α(m(s)) ds
)
is well defined and strictly positive. Moreover β ≤ 0, with strict inequality if pi(2,m) +
1
r
L2,mG > pi(1,m) +
1
r
L1,mG. Hence the integrand
exp
(
−
∫ t
0
α(m(s)) ds
)
β(m(t))
is non-positive. Moreover it is strictly negative with positive probability iff firm 2 is still
in contention. Hence the representation is well defined in the extended sense. (It could in
principle be −∞.) Hence Û2(x) ≤ 0, with strict inequality iff firm 2 is still in contention.
36If pi(2,m) + 1r L2,mG = pi(1,m) +
1
r L1,mG, then we will get one of these two equalities, but there is
no simple criterion to tell us which. In particular, the result may depend on the direction in which we
take the derivative w.r.t. m1.
Figure 1: The Worker's Choice of Employer in Scenario 1 IF2 < F1 < F1 < F2M
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The worker's choice of employer I depicted in HG1, G2L-space, where Gk is the Gittins index of firm k.
H1L If G1 > G2 Hblue regionL then I = 1, and if G2 > G1 Hgreen regionL then I = 2. H2L If G1 = G2 = F1 or
G1 = G2 = F1 Htwo of the five blue pointsL then I is determined by the need to ensure that a solution to
the dynamics exists. H3L If F
1
< G1 = G2 < F1 Hred lineL then I is indeterminate, but the solution of the
dynamics does not depend upon I . H4L If the worker is currently employed by firm 2, and if there is a strictly
positive probability that she will later switch to firm 1, then G > F2. HThis is the case G1 < G2 < F2.L H5L
If the worker is currently employed by firm 2, but the probability that she will later switch to firm 1 is
zero, then G = F2. HThis is the case G2 = F2.L H6L If the worker is currently employed by firm 1, and if
there is a strictly positive probability that she will later switch to firm 2, then G > F1. HThis is the case
G2 < G1 < F1 and F1 < G2.L H7L If the worker is currently employed by firm 1, but the probability that
she will later switch to firm 2 is zero, then G = F1. HThis happens when either G2 £ G1 = F1 or G2 £ F1.L
Figure 2: The Worker's Choice of Employer in Scenario 2 IF2 < F1 < F2 < F1M
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The worker's choice of employer I in Scenario 2 depicted in HG1, G2L-space, where Gk is the Gittins index of firm k.
H1L If G1 > G2 Hblue regionL then I = 1, and if G2 > G1 Hgreen regionL then I = 2. H2L If G1 = G2 = F1 Hone
of the five blue pointsL or G1 = G2 = F2 Hone of the two green pointsL then I is determined by the need to
ensure that a solution to the dynamics exists. H3L If F
1
< G1 = G2 < F2 Hred lineL then I is indeterminate,
but the solution of the dynamics does not depend upon I . H4L If the worker is currently employed by firm 2,
and if there is a strictly positive probability that she will later switch to firm 1, then G > F2. HThis is the case
G1 < G2 < F2.L H5L If the worker is currently employed by firm 2, but the probability that she will later switch
to firm 1 is zero, then G = F2. HThis is the case G1 £ G2 = F2.L H6L If the worker is currently employed by
firm 1, and if there is a strictly positive probability that she will later switch to firm 2, then G > F1. HThis is
the case G2 < G1 < F1 and F1 < G2.L H7L If the worker is currently employed by firm 1, but the probability
that she will later switch to firm 2 is zero, then G = F1. HThis happens when either G1 = F1 or G2 £ F1.L
